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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will analyze a number of cases involving embezzle-
ment by employees and agents using bank checks under the 1989 ver-
sion ("Old article 3"), and the 1990 version ("Revised article 3"), of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).I As the title to this Article suggests,
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida.
1. Revised article 3 has been adopted in 37 states and the District of Columbia. See
generally the commercial codes of Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
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employee stealing has been distressingly constant during the last cen-
tury. Only the applicable law has changed-first placing the loss on one
party, then the opposite party, and then attempting to apply a form of
comparative fault.
Too often law professors (including the author), in describing these
cases, stress the law as to the allocation of loss without confronting the
fact that the "loss" will almost invariably fall on innocent parties
(employers, drawees, and collecting banks), while the gain goes to the
embezzlers. The purpose of this Article is to alert readers to the various
schemes and indicate some ways of avoiding loss. In addition, it is
hoped that this Article will encourage a different approach for evaluating
cases in light of recent changes to the UCC.
II. FICTITIOUS PAYEES
A. Introduction
It is the rule, and has been for a long time, that if the drawer of a
check issues it payable to the order of "John Jones," the drawee-bank is
liable if it pays the check to the wrong "John Jones"-even if there
might be thousands of them in the United States.2 The legal question is
"to whom did the drawer intend that the check be paid?" Even where a
thief named "John Jones" steals the check from the mails, the bank has
the duty of paying the "right John Jones," according to the intent of the
drawer. Yet the drawee-bank has no real understanding of this intent
(beyond the wording of the check) until the drawer says: "You paid the
wrong John Jones."
Early Common Law courts had held that if the drawer intended that
some other John Jones be paid the check, such as a fictitious "John
Jones"3 or a person who impersonated the real "John Jones" and
deceived the drawer, then any loss should fall upon the drawer because
the bank was merely carrying out the drawer's intent. The drawer's
objective intent was determined to be payment to an impersonator who
dealt face to face, or, for one reason or the other, nonpayment to the
person named as payee on the check. Although these courts were articu-
lating the legalism of intent, they were really saying that the rigid rule of
absolute liability of banks must be tempered in those situations beyond
their control.
Regardless of the motivation of the courts, the English Bills of
Exchange Act of 1882 stated: "[w]here the payee is a fictitious or non-
2. This assumes that the drawer has not substantially contributed to the forgery by his
negligence. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1990); U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989).
3. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, §§ 56, 200 (3d ed.,
Boston, Little, Brown 1853).
[Vol. 49:607
CHECK SCAMS
existing person the bill may be treated as payable to the bearer."4 This
section meant, of course, that the instrument need not be indorsed, and
where it was, the indorsement would be treated as surplusage without
legal effect. It was decided that the payee need not be a fictitious, non-
existing person, but if the drawer intended the named payee, a real per-
son, should have no interest in the check, the transaction was within the
statute.
5
Section 9 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) in the
United States followed the English model:
The instrument is payable to bearer:...
3. When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing
person, and such fact was known to the person making it so
payable; or
4. When the name of the payee does not purport to be the
name of any person; ....
The American Bankers Association perceived that subsection 3 was
too narrow and recommended amending it to read:
The instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of
a fictitious or non-existing or living person not intended to have any
interest in it and such fact was known to the person making it so
payable or known to his employee or other agent who supplies the
name of such payee.7
The amendment clearly covered cases where the payee although a real
person was not intended to have any interest in the instrument, and the
cases where a dishonest employee or agent of the drawer supplied the
name of the payee.
It is notable that neither the English Bills of Exchange Act nor the
Negotiable Instruments Law attempted to deal with the question of
impersonation. This omission was corrected in Old section 3-405 of the
UCC:
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is
effective if
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the
4. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 61, § 7(3) (Eng.).
5. JOSEPH D. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 324-327 (Frederick K. Beutel ed.,
7th ed. 1948); JOSEPH D. BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED 79-80
(Zechariah Chafee, Jr. ed., 4th ed. 1926). For additional studies in the area of check scams under
the Old and Revised articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, see generally Donald J. Rapson, Loss Allocation
in Forgery and Fraud Cases: Significant Changes Under Revised Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L.
REV. 435 (1991) and James S. Bailey, Comment, Allocation of Loss for Forged Checks Under
Articles 3 and 4 of the UC.C. and the Proposed Revisions Thereto, 22 PAC. L. J. 1263 (1991).
6. UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 9, 3B U.L.A. 506 (1992).
7. WILLIAM E. BRITTON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 425 (2d ed. 1961).
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maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confed-
erate in the name of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends
the payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied
him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have
no such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of
the person so indorsing.8
The former rule deeming fictitious payee instruments to be bearer
instruments was abandoned, and the law soon required an indorsement.
The net result, however, remained the same. Subsection (c) of Old sec-
tion 3-405(1) adopted the NIL section 9 amendment, and the current
approach is found in Revised section 3-404.9
After more than a century of development, the Revised rule has
come full circle in many respects. First, the declaration that "[a]ny per-
8. U.C.C. § 3-405 (1990).
9.
§ 3-404. Impostors; Fictitious Payees.
(a) If an impostor, by use of the mails or otherwise, induces the issuer of an
instrument to issue the instrument to the impostor, or to a person acting in
concert with the impostor, by impersonating the payee of the instrument or
a person authorized to act for the payee, an indorsement of the instrument
by any person in the name of the payee is effective as the indorsement of
the payee in favor of a person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or
takes it for value or for collection.
(b) If (i) a person whose intent determines to whom an instrument is payable
(Section 3-110(a) or (b)) does not intend the person identified as payee to
have any interest in the instrument, or (ii) the person identified as payee of
an instrument is a fictitious person, the following rules apply until the
instrument is negotiated by special indorsement:
(1) Any person in possession of the instrument is its holder.
(2) An indorsement by any person in the name of the payee stated in the
instrument is effective as the indorsement of the payee in favor of a
person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or
for collection.
(c) Under subsection (a) or (b), an indorsement is made in the name of a payee
if (i) it is made in a name substantially similar to that of the payee or (ii)
the instrument, whether or not indorsed, is deposited in a depositary bank
to an account in a name substantially similar to that of the payee.
(d) With respect to an instrument to which subsection (a) or (b) applies, if a
person paying the instrument or taking it for value or for collection fails to
exercise ordinary care in paying or taking the instrument and that failure
substantially contributes to loss resulting from payment of the instrument,
the person bearing the loss may recover from the person failing to exercise
ordinary care to the extent the failure to exercise ordinary care contributed
to the loss.
U.C.C. § 3-404 (1990).
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son in possession of the instrument is its holder" 10 seems to partially
revive the old idea of bearer paper. Second, the revision abandons the
idea that the intent of the employee who supplied the name of the payee
to his employer governs; now it is the intent of the signer under Revised
section 3-110 that controls. Third, subsection (c) has dispensed with the
necessity of indorsement. Fourth, the minority view requirement that
the indorsement must be an exact replication of the payee's name on the
face of the instrument (the "mirror image" rule) has been rejected.
Finally, a duty of exercising ordinary care is now imposed upon payor
banks and takers of these instruments. 1
B. Authorized Signing Employees Who Steal
The fictitious payee caper can assume many forms. For example,
in Retail Shoe Health Commission v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co.,2 the administrator of an employee health fund prepared duplicate
vouchers for medical benefits submitted by the fund's beneficiaries.
Then, as an authorized signer, he issued duplicate checks payable to fic-
titious payees using forged indorsements, and deposited the checks in
various banks.' 3 The fraud continued from 1972 to 1979, and apparently
only his death interrupted the scam that diverted $675,634 from the
fund.14 Upon discovery, the fund sued the drawee bank and the deposi-
tary bank, among others. 5 The court took notice of the agreement
between the fund and the drawee bank that required the fund to give
written notice to the bank, within six months, of any forged indorse-
ments or improper payments, and to commence any lawsuit within
eighteen months. 6 The court held that since most of the checks fell
outside this period the suits were barred. ' 7 Apart from the agreement,
however, the court found that Old section 3-405 barred suits against
both drawee and collecting banks.' 8 This case suggests that banks are
well-advised to shorten the one year discovery and reporting period pro-
vided in Old and Revised section 4-406.
On occasion, an officer of the drawer and an outsider will conspire
together to cheat the drawer. For example, in Braswell Motor Freight
Lines, Inc. v. Bank of Salt Lake,19 Kendall (a person who had no connec-
10. U.C.C. § 3-404(b)(1) (1990).
11. U.C.C. § 3-404(d) (1990).
12. 558 N.Y.S.2d 949 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
13. Id. at 951.
14. Id. at 950.
15. Id. at 951.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 952.
18. Id.
19. 502 P.2d 560 (Utah 1972).
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tion with the employer-drawer) opened a bank account in the name of
Braswell Motor Freight Lines.20 Kendall then had Wertz (an ex-con-
vict), the assistant comptroller of Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc.,
draw checks payable to Braswell Motor Freight, omitting the "Inc."
from Braswell's corporate name, which Kendall then deposited in the
false account.21 The two crooks stole $574,031.32 from the drawer-
employer.22 The employer then sued the drawee-bank, and the court
held that Kendall's and Wertz's actions fitted all parts of Old section 3-
405: Kendall was an impostor, Wertz intended the payee to have no
interest in the checks, and Wertz supplied the name of the payee
intending the payee to have no interest in the checks.23 The Editors'
Note in the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service correctly
notes the court's error in finding that Wertz's supplying the name of the
payee to Kendall would satisfy Old section 3-405(c). 24 Subsection (c)
requires the name be supplied to the maker or drawer;25 Kendall was
neither.
In addition, the court was also in error in stating that where "an
agent of a drawer of a check supplies the name of a payee which he
intends to have no interest therein, the check is deemed to be payable to
bearer, and an endorsement of the payee's name on the check is not a
forgery. ' 26 The court's obvious reference to Section 9(3) of the old
amended NIL,27 shows that old memories are hard to erase.
If an insurance company delivers blank insurance drafts to an
independent agent with actual authority to complete and deliver them, it
cannot recover against a merely negligent bank that pays on drafts pre-
pared by a dishonest agent and payable to fictitious payees. 28 Even if
the insurance company limits the agent's authority to drafts of $250.00
or less, a bank is not liable for drafts to fictitious payees under Old
section 3-405 which exceed that amount.2 9
Old section 3-405(1)(a) provided that an indorsement by "any per-
son in the name of a named payee is effective .... ,,30 A small number
20. Id. at 561.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 560.
23. Id. at 561-62.
24. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Bank of Salt Lake, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1020, 1021 (Utah 1972).
25. U.C.C. § 3-405(c) (1989).
26. Braswell Motor Freight, 502 P.2d at 562.
27. UNIF. NEGOTIAIkLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 9(3), 3B U.L.A. 506 (1992).
28. Del Rio Discount, Corp. v. Commercial Bank, 593 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
29. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Co.,
519 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1975).
30. U.C.C. § 3-405(l)(a) (1989).
[Vol. 49:607
CHECK SCAMS
of courts interpreted the words "in the name of a named payee" to
require that the indorsement be in the identical words of the payee
named on the face of the check. This was known as the "mirror image"
rule. 31 This court-created rule seemed to be of dubious origin in light of
Old section 3-110, which provided that an instrument was payable to
order when it was payable to "any person therein specified with reason-
able certainty," 32 and Old section 3-203 provided that when an instru-
ment was made payable "to a person under a misspelled name or one
other than his own he may indorse in that name or his own or both.
33
Why should accuracy in the use of names be important in one section
and not in other sections of the code?
A recent New York federal court confronted the "mirror image"
rule in a case where the fictitious payee was "Empire Paper & Envelope
Co.," and the indorsement read:
For Deposit Only
Empire Paper & Envelope Co.,
Div. of Burke, Wainwright & Evans, Inc.3 4
The check was deposited in the depositary bank in the name of "Burke,
Wainwright & Evans, Inc."'31 The court noted that a simple indorsement
in the name of "Empire Paper & Envelope Co." would have been proper
under Old section 3-405 .36 The narrow issue was whether the addition
of "Div. of Burke, Wainwright & Evans, Inc." made the indorsement
ineffective. The court, after review, held that the simple addition of the
quoted words was insufficient to bar the application of section 3-405. 37
The court further held that the mere failure of the depositary bank to
exercise ordinary care in handling the check would not make the deposi-
tary bank liable to the drawee bank.38
A year later, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a similar
fictitious payee scenario, likewise finding the mere negligence of a
depositary bank in a suit by the drawer irrelevant to its liability under
Old section 3-405.39 However, the court was confronted by a different
situation. A manager in the dividend department of Prudential Insurance
induced his employer to issue dividend checks to two fictitious compa-
31. See, e.g., Wellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
32. U.C.C. § 3-110(1) (1989).
33. U.C.C. § 3-204 (1989).
34. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. NCNB Nat'l Bank, 695 F. Supp. 162, 163
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 164.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 164-65.
39. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 536 N.E.2d 1118, 1126 (N.Y. 1989).
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nies and deposited the checks in two New York banks.40 The embezzler
stole approximately $18.9 million working with an outsider who han-
dled the deposits in the two false accounts.41 In order to facilitate the
scam, the crooks paid $165,000 to two employees of the depositary,
Citibank.42 Prudential sued Citibank on the ground, among others, that
Citibank was guilty of "commercial bad faith. 43 Citibank defended on
the ground that these two employees were adverse agents of Citibank
and their misdeeds should not be charged to Citibank." Deciding on a
narrow record of limited facts, the Court of Appeals stated:
There may well prove to be merit in Citibank's contentions that all
involved employees were either adverse agents or at most negligent;
indeed, the issues may even be subject to resolution by way of
motion, short of trial. Moreover, plaintiff bears a heavy burden to
sustain its assertions of bank dishonesty or - to use the Brighton test
plaintiff advocates - of complicity by principals of the bank in alleged
confederation with the wrongdoers. A showing short of the bank's
bad faith will not suffice to shift the loss from plaintiff, where it has
been squarely placed by the Legislature in UCC § 3-405(l)(c). Great
though plaintiff's burden may be, however, its assertions of bad faith
are sufficient at this time to withstand dismissal of the complaint.45
Some of the scams could have originated as movie scripts. An ex-
convict, recently released after serving nine years for theft and other
offenses, was employed by the city of Phoenix under a government
funded program to assist ex-convicts. 6 After starting in a nonsensitive
area, he was assigned to prepare warrants to pay vendors to the city.
47
An accomplice opened a checking account in the name of Duncan
Industries, and the ex-convict soon prepared two warrants payable to
Duncan Industries each in the amount of $514,320.40. 41 The duplicate
warrant was deposited in the Duncan Industries account, and the accom-
plice then withdrew over $441,000.00 from the account through cash-
ier's checks made payable to coin and stamp or diamond and bullion
dealers.49
The court held that the loss fell on the City of Phoenix under Old
40. Id. at 1120.
41. Id. at 1119.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1121.
45. Id. at 1126.







section 3-405, and the alleged negligence of the bank in the opening and
withdrawal stages was not relevant to the question of liability of the
drawer depositary bank.50 This lack of care did not evidence bad faith
by the bank.
This distinction between negligence and bad faith was frequently
mentioned by the courts before the addition of Revised article 3,51 and
will now assume added importance in light of Revised section 3-
404(d). 2
C. Cosigning Employees-One of Whom Is a Crook
When checks are cosigned, the intent of the crooked cosigner deter-
mines whether the check is payable to a fictitious person.53 Old section
3-405(1)(b) and (c), and comment 3, and Revised sections 3-404(b) and
comment 2, case number 2, and 3-110(a), comment 1, call for this result.
Revised article 3, however, has merely and needlessly complicated legal
research.
D. Crooked Nonsigning Employees Who Supply the Names of the
Fictitious Payees
The case of Delmar Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.54 nicely illus-
trates case development during a transitional state of the law. An insur-
ance company employee wrongfully directed the company to issue
50. Id. at 970.
51. In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 371 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
an insurance company employee and agent supplied the name of a policy holder and induced the
company to issue a $20,000 check to the order of the insured. The agent obtained the check,
forged the policy holder's name, and transferred it to his alleged bookie who obtained payment on
the check. Id. at 1003. The insurance company sued the bank, and the court held that any
negligence of the bank would not be relevant under Old section 3-405, but that bad faith of the
bank would be relevant. Id. McCarthy, Kenney & Reidy, P.C. v. First Nat'l Bank, 524 N.E.2d
390 (Mass. 1988), also followed the majority rule that the good faith, but not the negligence, of
the drawee bank is relevant.
A drawee bank, however, that pays checks with either illegible indorsements or no
indorsements at all, may raise a question of bad faith as a bar to the assertion of the fictitious
payee rule. See Kraftsman Container Corp. v. United Counties Trust Co., 404 A.2d 1288 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979). Under Old section 3-405, the Nebraska courts held that if the
negligence of the depositary bank is asserted by the drawer of the check, the Megligence must be
the proximate cause of the loss. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Center Bank, 275 N.W.2d 73 (1979).
One Kentucky court has expressly followed this view. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Crisp, 27 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 138 (Callaghan) (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
The case of Wymore State Bank v. Johnson Int'l Co., 873 F.2d 1092 (8th Cir. 1989),
following the law of Nebraska, held that negligence of the depositary bank may be used to as a
defense to the utilization of Old section 3-405 in a fictitious payee case. The case presents an
interesting analysis of the negligence aspects of the forger and the depositary bank's actions.
52. For a discussion of comparative fault, see infra section VII.
53. Wright v. Bank of California, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
54. 300 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
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twenty checks totalling $24,600 as loan checks to an insured." The
employee then obtained possession of the checks and cashed them at a
bank.56 Four checks were issued during the time that the NIL was in
effect in Missouri, and the remaining sixteen checks were issued under
the old UCC.5 7 The court held that since the employee supplied the
name of the payee for the first four checks, they were payable to bearer
under the NIL.5 The remaining checks could have been indorsed by
any person because they were payable to a fictitious person under Old
section 3-405 of the UCC.59 Therefore, regardless of which law
applied, the loss fell on the insurance company.6°
Old section 3-405 has been labeled as "a banker's provision,"
intended to narrow the liability of banks and broaden the responsibility
of their customers.6' However, on occasion, it can be a "banker's boom-
erang." A Texas bank's factoring department purchased accounts
receivables of two corporations, under a factoring agreement requiring
the bank to issue periodic checks to the two companies "for money col-
lected. ' 62 A bank employee submitted unauthorized forms requesting
the issuance of checks to the two companies.63 The employee inter-
cepted the cashier's checks, forged the indorsements, and deposited a
total of $903,300 in the depositary bank.64 The court held that Old sec-
tions 3-405 and 3-418 (the finality of payment rule), completely barred
recovery from the depositary bank.65
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. First Pennsylvania Banking &
Trust Co.,66 a representative of a stockbroker devised a scheme of filling
out unauthorized sell orders on customers' "cash accounts. 67 As stocks
were sold he would intercept the confirmation slips so the customer
would not learn of the sale. The representative would then obtain the
checks by telling the company's cashier that he was meeting the cus-
tomer and would deliver the checks.68 After forging the customer's
indorsement, he would either deposit them in his accounts, or cash them
55. Id. at 497.
56. Id.




61. J.J. WHITE & R.S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 639 (2d ed. 1980).
62. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. First City Bank, 675 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 319.
66. 451 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1971).
67. Id. at 893.
68. Id. at 894.
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at check cashing agencies.69
On "margin accounts," the representative would compute how
much was owed to a customer, procure a check payable to that customer,
and cash or deposit these checks.7" He obtained $88,213.827" (which
had some meaning during the early sixties). When a few customers dis-
cerned what the broker representative was doing, he bribed them into
silence, allegedly giving more than $20,000 to one customer alone.72
The company's action against the drawee bank met with Old sec-
tion 3-405 as a defense, on the theory that the representative supplied
his employer with the names of the payees, and he did not intend that
they would receive the checks or proceeds.73 The court distinguished
Snug Harbor Realty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank,74 a factually similar case,
because in Snug Harbor creditors of genuine invoices "supplied" their
names while in New Amsterdam, the employee supplied the names of
customers who were not actually owed anything thereby making the
checks payable to "fictitious" payees. 7
5
Today, under Revised section 3-404, supplying the names would
have no legal effect. However, with the amount of actual and apparent
authority that the broker-representative had under New Amsterdam, he
would seemingly fit under the "entrustment rule," discussed later in this
Article. 76 The result should be the same with the loss falling upon the
employer.
A recent case illustrates how a dishonest stockbroker can cheat both
his employer and his customers. 77 A broker with the title of vice presi-
dent of Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., was contacted by a representa-
tive of two corporations, requesting that the broker establish and manage
three separate accounts.7" The representative gave a check for
$460,150.23 made payable to ABP Investments.79 There was no
existing account at Shearsons, and the broker opened one in the ABP
Investments name by forging the names of the customers.80 The check
was deposited and the stockbroker soon opened a post office box
address in the name of ABP Investments without customer authoriza-
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 893.
72. Id. at 895.
73. Id.
74. 253 A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
75. New Amsterdam, 451 F.2d at 897-98.
76. See infra section IV.
77. Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Wasatch Bank, 788 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Utah 1992).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1186-87.
80. Id. at 1187.
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tion.8' Over a period of eleven months, the broker induced Shearson to
issue checks on the ABP account payable to ABP Investments, obtained
them from the post office box, and deposited them (after he indorsed
them) in his personal account.82 The stockbroker stole thirty-seven
checks, totalling $504,295.30, and the facts showed that the depositary
bank was very careless in depositing them. 3 Shearsons settled with
their customers for $1,208,903 and then brought suit against the deposi-
tary bank.84 The court held that the broker's conduct induced Shearson
to issue the checks under Old section 3-405, and that the initial loss
should fall on Shearson,85 and also found that the negligence of the
depositary bank should not deprive it of the impostor rule protection.
Shearson, which succeeded to its customer's claims by virtue of an
assignment from their customers, could not recover from the depositary
bank as a "payee" of the fraudulently obtained checks.86
If the same facts arose today, the intent of the Shearson official
who signed the checks would control, and not the dishonest intent of the
supplying stockbroker. On the other hand, the broker was not only a
seller but a vice president, which might have been enough under the
"entrustment doctrine" of Revised section 3-405.
The "padded payroll caper" can work even when the employer has
separate payroll offices in different cities. In a recent South Carolina
case87 the payroll clerk in the branch office of a company ordered pay-
roll checks from the company's main office. The checks were for
employees either on leave, or who had recently left employment, and
included supplemental checks to correct alleged errors in prior payroll
payments.88 The employees of the bank that cashed the checks testified
to believing the clerk was authorized to cash the checks for those
employees who could not come to the bank. 89 The testimony showed
that the checks were not indorsed at the bank, the clerk never presented
identification or authorization documents, and the bank failed to meet its
own guidelines in cashing the checks. 90 The court nonetheless held that
the negligence of the bank in the payment of these checks did not affect




84. Id. at 1188.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1199.
87. Stone Mfg. Co. v. NCNB of South Carolina, 417 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992).
88. Id. at 629.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 631.
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decision is not entirely clear, it would appear that the payroll checks
which were received by the clerk in the branch office were signed at the
home office by someone else. If this analysis is correct, then today
under Revised section 3-404 the intent of the unknown signer, and not
that of the dishonest clerk, would control. However, the "entrustment
rule" 92 would again come into play, and would apparently place the
resulting loss on the employer.
Both Revised sections 3-404 and 3-405 of the UCC advance the
view that if a person paying an instrument or taking it for value or for
collection fails to exercise ordinary care, and that failure substantially
contributes to loss resulting from the fraud in paying the instrument, the
person bearing the loss may recover from the person failing to exercise
ordinary care to the extent the failure contributed to the loss. 93
Although these sections cover the fault of both the drawee (the
payor bank) and the taking banks (depositary and collecting banks), the
comments to both sections seem confined to the lack of ordinary care of
the latter, and no attention is devoted to lack of care of the former. 94 A
pre-revision case may help to fill part of this hiatus. In Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Chemical Bank" an accounts payable
employee of Merrill Lynch supplied the check issuing department with
false invoices for New York suppliers. 96 Checks were issued to these
suppliers (whose addresses were typed on the checks), and the employee
(or his accomplices) opened accounts in the payees' names in California
and Ohio banks. 97 The checks were then deposited with the out-of-state
banks, and collected from Chemical Bank in New York.98 When sued
by Merrill Lynch, Chemical Bank impleaded the Federal Reserve col-
lecting bank which asserted that Old section 3-405 protected them in
this situation. 99 The court held that Old section 3-405 made these
checks payable to the named payees and the forged indorsements were
effective.' 00 Insofar as the care of the drawee bank was concerned, the
court held that the alleged failure to review the indorsements on the back
of the checks did not impose any liability upon the drawee bank.''
92. Revised section 3-405. See infra section IV.
93. U.C.C. § 3-404 (1990); U.C.C. § 3-405 (1990).
94. The comparative fault concept is discussed infra, section VII.
95. 442 N.E.2d 1253 (N.Y. 1982).




100. Id. at 1257.
101. Id.
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While the indorsements were of an "irregular nature,"1 2 the court did
not discuss the possible liability of the depositary banks. It would seem
that Revised sections 3-404 and 3-405 have reraised the issue.
Although it might not be required for a drawee bank to examine the
indorsement chain on presented checks, it might well be incumbent upon
depositary banks to raise the issue of corporate payees in New York
having accounts in distant states and checks bearing irregular
indorsements.
In analyzing alleged fictitious payee cases, it sometimes becomes
necessary to distinguish the actual fictitious payee case from a situation
that resembles, but is not, a fictitious payee transaction. For example,
Mr. Jaquish, an employee in the trust department of Lincoln Bank,
secured the execution of thirty-three cashier's checks payable to Grove-
land Bank. 10 3 Jaquish opened an account in the Groveland Bank in the
name of "Terra Bella Stock Farm, Richard Jaquish and Phyllis Jaquish,"
by telling Groveland Bank that he was purchasing a farm in the area, and
that he had inherited a large trust fund from a recently deceased grand-
mother.' °4 He indorsed and delivered the checks to Groveland which
deposited them in the newly opened account. 0 5 Before disappearing,
Jaquish successfully embezzled $333,829.74.106 The plaintiff bonding
company sued in the name of Lincoln Bank against Groveland Bank,
and the defendant asserted the fictitious payee rule as a defense. The
court held that Groveland was, of course, not fictitious, but a real
payee. 10 7 "[T]he benefit of the statute runs to those who acquire an
interest subsequent to the forgery of the endorsement; it does not
improve the status of the named payee or of the person who actually
executes the indorsement."' 0 8 The court went on to find that since Lin-
coln Bank had no contractual relationship with Groveland Bank, it was
incumbent upon Groveland Bank to inquire why checks were being
issued to the order of Groveland without any indication as to whose
account the checks were to be deposited.' 0 9 Groveland received funds
102. The purported corporate signatures were, among other things, sometimes handwritten and
often illegible. Id. at 1255.
103. Federal Ins. Co. v. Groveland State Bank, 354 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). The
facts in Sun'n Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 582 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1978), greatly resemble
the facts in Federal Insurance, except the wrongdoer in Sun'n Sand altered the amounts of the
checks after they were signed. Justice Mosk, in his confusing majority opinion, discussed section
3-405 but did allow recovery by the drawer against the payee bank. Id. at 678-79, 693.
104. Id. at 223.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 224.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 225.
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belonging to Lincoln and "was obligated to retain such funds subject to
direction of the owner."
110
E. Employee Who Decides to Steal After She Signs as Drawer or
After She Supplies the Payees' Names
It has been judicially noted that the old fictitious payee rule of sec-
tion 3-405 would not apply if the indorser originally intended that the
named payee receive the check, but then changed his mind and diverted
the check.'1 ' Now, under Revised section 3-405 if the signer is an
"entrusted person" he has the power to indorse the check no matter when
his intention arose. 1
2
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Dayton, Price & Co.
v. First National City Bank,113 imply that checks signed by the use of a
facsimile signature of the drawer, if a dishonest employee formed the
intent to steal after they were signed, would not fall under the fictitious
payee rule."
14
It can be fun in the classroom to discuss the "when did the thief
decide to steal" question. Assume, however, a morally and financially
impoverished employer is told by his lawyer "if your employee decided
to steal after you signed the checks, then we can recover from the
drawee bank, but if she intended to steal when she supplied the names of
the payees on the checks, we have no right of recovery because of the
fictitious payee rule." The employer then visits the former employee in
jail and relays this information. The employer hints that if the employee
testifies to forming her intent after the checks were signed by the
employer, then the employer may be less than diligent in prosecuting the
criminal charges against her. It is doubtful that the employee will be
troubled about shaping her testimony, but should the law encourage
perjury?
F. Crooked Employees Who Prepare Fictitious Payee Checks and
Then Increase the Amounts Payable After the Checks Are
Signed
The recent case of Washington Savings Bank v. First Fidelity
Bank"5 involved a loan department employee at Washington who pre-
pared cashier's checks. The employee gave one check for $250,000 to
110. Id.
111. Ostrom-Martin, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 155 B.R. 997, 1001 (Bkrtcy. C.D. I11. 1993).
Accord Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 424 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
112. U.C.C. § 3-404 cmt. 2, case 1 (1990).
113. 406 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
114. Id. at 824-25; see also the questionable holdings in Sun 'n Sand, 582 P.2d at 920.
115. 634 A.2d 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
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her husband who deposited it in his account at Fidelity." 6 The
employee changed a second check for $40,000, made payable to a loan
applicant, to $400,000 after it was signed by the applicant, and deposited
it." 7 The employee increased the amount of a third check from $50,000
to $500,000; like the second check, the amount line was blank when it
was signed."'8 The fourth check was raised from a small amount to
$250,000, while the employee also erased the name of the payee." 9 On
the fifth check, for $840.00, the employee raised the value to
$205,840.00, and erased and changed the payee's name. 20 The final
check was raised from $340.00 to $340,000, and the employee forged
the name of this payee.' 2 ' The employee intended that none of the true
payees was to have an interest in the checks. The drawer-drawee Wash-
ington Bank sued the depositary-collecting Fidelity Bank for negligence
and breach of warranty.
122
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding that all of the
checks were governed by the "faithless employee, or fictitious payee
rule" of Old section 3-405.123 Further, the breach of warranty claim
under Old section 4-207(1), based upon two checks with visible altera-
tions, was dismissed because of the "egregious" misconduct of the
drawer-drawee bank in signing checks for unspecified amounts and
placing the employee in a position of making certain that the bank paid
them: 124 the plaintiff did not pay the checks in good faith.
125
Some might quarrel with the court's characterization of naive con-
duct by the drawer-drawee bank as constituting bad faith on the question
of breach of warranty by the presenting bank. A stronger case might be
made that the depositary bank as a good faith holder made no alteration
warranties under Old section 4-207.
What would be the result if the same case were tried under Revised
articles 3 and 4? Under Revised section 4-208, the depositary bank
would warrant to the drawer-drawee bank that the checks were not
altered. The depositary bank could then assert a defense that the altera-
tions were caused by the negligence of the drawer-drawee bank, and that
liability be allocated on a comparative fault basis. Considered in the
assessment of fault would be the negligence of the depositary bank in
116. Id. at 150.
117. Id.
118. Id.




123. Id. at 151.




opening an account for the husband of an employee of the drawer-
drawee bank and allowing the deposit of obviously altered checks for
large amounts into this new account.
On a more practical note, how could this kind of scam be avoided?
An obvious answer, of course, is to refuse to sign checks that are incom-
plete in any respect and to insist that the amounts be written by a check-
writing machine. Another way might be to program the drawer-drawee
bank's computer to reject checks over a certain amount, and only two
persons (a trusted officer and the programmer) would know the "magic"
number. Rejected checks would then be subject to individual attention.
While this approach would likely catch large checks like those involved
in Washington Savings, it would not be effective if the crook were steal-
ing small sums on a continuing basis.
G. Genuine Invoice Payee Checks-When Is a Real Payee Fictitious
and When Is a Fictitious Payee Genuine?
Old section 3-405 of the UCC provided that "an endorsement by
any person in the name of a named payee is effective if... an agent or
employee of the... drawee has supplied him with the name of the payee
intending the latter to have no such interest." '126 These seemingly innoc-
uous words lose some of their clarity when an employee physically
hands genuine invoices and corporate checks to an authorized corporate
officer for signature, and intends to take the checks and forge the
payee's name. Does this employee come within the provision?
A leading New York case 127 followed the comments to Old section
3-405 which addressed situations involving padded payrolls where the
named payee on a check supplied by the crook had no right to the check.
The comments failed to discuss the so-called genuine check in payment
of a genuine invoice (or perhaps genuine payroll records for a real
employee). The court relied on the comments and on two cases from
other jurisdictions which held that when genuine invoices are submitted
by real suppliers and the check is not payable to a fictitious person (or a
person not intended to have an interest in the check), the indorsement is
a forgery and the drawee and/or depositary banks are liable.' 28 This
view resulted from taking words of the Official Comment out of con-
126. U.C.C. § 3-405 (1989).
127. Danje Fabrics v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). The
fictitious rule is inapplicable where a true debt is owed to the payee. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co. v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 451 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1971); Girard Bank v. Mount
Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.J. 1979).
128. Danje Fabrics, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
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text. 129 The comment stressed that the risk from this type of fraud
should be the employer's rather than the bank's, which has absolutely no
way of determining in any particular case which checks represent pay-
ment for genuine invoices.
For better or worse, these types of cases are eliminated in states that
adopted Revised section 3-404. Now, it is not the intent of the dishonest
employee, but the intent of the check signer that controls. Secondly, the
new "entrustment rule," discussed infra, places the risk of loss back on
the employer, as the original comment to Old section 3-405 suggested.








In the above diagram, the crook is not an employee of the drawer
but an employee or attorney for the payee. Hence, neither Old section
3-405 nor Revised section 3-404 apply because they are designed to
pertain in very limited circumstances. In addition, here a crook is not
impersonating anyone, he is merely lying about his authority, and
agency law, more than commercial law, applies.
129.
4. Paragraph (c) is new. It extends the rule of the original Subsection 9(3) to
include the padded payroll cases, where the drawer's agent or employee prepares
the check for signature or otherwise furnishes the signing officer with the name of
the payee. The principle followed is that the loss should fall upon the employer as a
risk of his business enterprise rather than upon the subsequent holder or drawee.
The reasons are that the employer is normally in a better position to prevent such
forgeries by reasonable care in the selection or supervision of his employees, or, if
he is not, is at least in a better position to cover the loss by fidelity insurance; and
that the cost of such insurance is properly an expense of his business rather than of
the business of the holder or drawee.
The provision applies only to the agent or employee of the drawer, and only to
the agent or employee who supplies him with the name of the payee. The following
situations illustrate its application.
a. An employee of a corporation prepares a padded payroll for its treasurer,
which includes the name of P. P does not exist, and the employee knows it, but the
treasurer does not. The treasurer draws the corporation's check payable to P.
b. The same facts as (a), except that P exists and the employee knows it but
intends him to have no interest in the check. In both cases an indorsement by any
person in the name of P is effective and the loss falls on the corporation.
U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 4 (1989).
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On too many occasions joint payee and fictitious payee problems
become confusingly intertwined. For example, a dishonest lawyer rep-
resenting a tort claimant forges the claimant's name on a general release
form to induce an insurance company to issue a check made payable to
the client and attorney as joint payees. The attorney forges the client's
name, deposits the check, and then absconds with the proceeds. The
client eventually learns of the fraud, and retains new counsel to assist
her.
The new attorney is faced with paradoxical options. If the client
objects to the amount of settlement, she may chose to proceed on the
underlying cause of action against the defendant who is insured by the
defrauded insurance company; however the statute of limitations may
have run during the interim. The next alternative is to sue the insurance
company on the settlement and claim that the insurance company did not
pay the claimant, but rather the dishonest attorney. This approach can
be disastrous. A court may hold that the claimant ratified the unauthor-
ized settlement by suing on the payment, and is now bound. A variation
of this approach was used by a New Jersey court that found where a
defrauded client was reimbursed by a bar association security fund, and
the fund sued the insurance company for conversion, there was no ratifi-
cation by the fund and it could recover.
1 30
The question remains as to whether the issuer of an insurance check
or draft is discharged on the underlying claim when an attorney forges
the client's name on the instrument. Section 178(2) of the Restatement
of Agency adopts the rule (founded on numerous common law cases):
"If an agent who is authorized to receive a check payable to the principal
as conditional payment forges the principal's endorsement to such a
check, the maker is relieved of liability to the principal if the drawee
bank pays the check and charges the amount to the maker.'
3'
Another New Jersey case adopted this rule and discharged the
issuer, but held that the release by ratification would not extend to the
collecting bank in an action for conversion.'
32 A Florida case' 33
expressly followed this rule, holding that when a drawer and drawee are
the same company on an insurance draft (as distinguished from a check
drawn by the insurance company on a bank) the drawer is released under
the rule, but the same company as drawee is liable for payment on a
130. Clients' Sec. Fund of the Bar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 530 A.2d 357, 361 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 178(2) (1984).
132. See generally Clarkson v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 406 A.2d 494 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.
1979).
133. Florida Bar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 391 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
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forged indorsement. 34 An important lesson emerges from this apparent
sophistry. An entity can avoid liability by choosing not to be both
drawer and drawee, but instead being a drawer upon a separate entity:
the bank. This approach was indirectly suggested in a prior Florida case
which held that an attorney who forges his client's name to a settlement
and insurance company's check has no power to settle the case without
the client's consent. 1 5 Where the client does not ratify the forgery, but
prevails against the original wrongdoer, the insurance company must
pay the defrauded client on the judgment, but can then claim against the
drawee bank on the original check because of the forgery of the client's
name. 1
36
Can an attorney who forges his client's name on a settlement agree-
ment and the ensuing checks (or drafts) be treated as an impostor under
Old section 3-405 and Revised section 3-404? A recent case pointed
out that the forging attorney is not impersonating anyone, least of all his
client. 37 He is acting as an agent, but he is not disguising his identity
and the impostor rule does not apply. Query: Would the new rule about
impersonating an agent of a principal apply under Revised section 3-
405? In the absence of any case authority, it is submitted that the
agency-impostor approach should not be allowed, because the attorney
is the agent-in-fact of the client. The dishonest lawyer is telling a false-
hood about the extent of his authority, not the fact of his agency. On the
other hand, can the fooled insurance company assert the "entrustment
doctrine" under Revised section 3-405? This question is discussed in
the entrustment portion of this Article.
The New York Court of Appeals expressly adopted section 178 of
the Restatement of Agency in a case where an attorney was authorized
in writing by his client to settle a case, and the attorney forged her name
on a draft made jointly payable to the client and the attorney. 138 The
court admitted that the cases were split on the power of an attorney to
sign his client's name to checks and drafts, and noted in the usual case
the defrauded client has recourse against the drawee bank in conversion
for paying on a forged indorsement.
39
134. Id. at 239-40.
135. Nehleber v. Anzalone, 345 So. 2d 822, 822-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
136. Id.
137. Clients' Sec. Fund of the Bar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 530 A.2d 357, 358 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987).
138. Hutzler v. Hertz Corp., 347 N.E.2d 627 (N.Y. 1976).
139. Id. at 631-32.
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I. Crooked Employee of Drawer Forges Both the Drawer's Name




















The Ohio case of Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National City Bank 40
would make a lovely final examination question for a sadistic commer-
cial law professor. A dishonest bookkeeper for Ed Stinn Chevrolet
devised the two schemes diagramed above. In the first scheme, illus-
trated by Diagram 1, the bookkeeper forged the name of an authorized
cosigner as drawer on the check. In the second scheme, set out in Dia-
gram 2, the bookkeeper obtained her authorized cosigner's signature
upon false representations regarding the purpose of the checks.' 4' The
bookkeeper forged the indorsement of either an employee-payee or a
totally fictitious person under both schemes, but in the first scenario she
forged the name of her cosigner as well; hence Diagram 1 presents the
"double forgery" caper. The bookkeeper deposited the proceeds from
these checks into the "cash box," and she would then steal money from
the cash box. The bookkeeper netted approximately $284,000, but she
made restitution of approximately $108,000. The drawer sued the
drawee bank for the difference.
1 42
A jury found the drawer eighty-five percent negligent and the
140. 503 N.E.2d 524 (Ohio 1987).
141. Id. at 526.
142. Id.
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drawee bank fifteen percent negligent, and since Stinn's negligence
exceeded the bank's negligence, awarded him nothing. 4 3 An appellate
court reversed, stating that comparative negligence was not to be used in
a breach of contract action, and deducting the amount of checks that
exceeded the statutory one year limit for reporting, awarded $176,000 to
Stinn. 144
The bank appealed, and the Ohio Supreme Court, in the "devilishly
complex appeal,"'' 45 addressed the question of whether the court should
emphasize the forgery of the cosigning drawer or the forgery of the pay-
ees' indorsements. The court held, under Perini Corp. v. First National
Bank,14 6 that the forgery of the drawer's signature was crucial, and
remanded the case for a determination of damages due to the drawer
corporation. 1
47
The court also held that the second scheme (Diagram 2) was gov-
erned by Old section 3-405, and the bank was not liable for cashing the
checks.' 48 Finally, the court opined that in a Diagram 1 scenario, recov-
ery could not be had from the drawee because, in effect, the bookkeeper
was stealing cash that was within the possession of the drawer, 149 and
not from the proceeds of these checks. The court equated the facts in
this case with those of a Pennsylvania case:
Interestingly, appellant draws our attention to a Pennsylvania case
which could have served as a pattern for [the bookkeeper's] scheme
in this instance. In Wiest v. First Citizens Nat ' Bank, supra, a dis-
honest bookkeeper stole cash from her employer and later shielded
the embezzlement by forging a check drawn on the employer's inac-
tive bank account and depositing it into the boss' active account. As
in this case, office records were dummied by the worker to coincide
with deposits.... Holding in favor of the bank, the Wiest court...
stated . . . "The funds transferred by the embezzling employee from
the plaintiff's inactive bank account to the active office bank account
were not removed from the dominion and control of the plaintiff.
Certainly it would be illogical to adjudge that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover monies which he has received and which he has either
retained or used."' 50
The Ohio Supreme Court also held that recovery could not be had
143. Id. at 527.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 528.
146. 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977).
147. Ed Stinn Chevrolet, 503 N.E.2d at 538.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 536-37.




on any checks which exceeded the one year deadline of Old section 4-
406.
What would be the result if an equally talented bookkeeper repli-
cated the behavior of the bookkeeper in Ed Stinn Chevrolet today? Tak-
ing the easier problem first, it would seem that Revised section 4-406
would apply the same one year rule to the late reporting of the cosigner
forgeries on the checks. The one year rule should not have any affect as
to the indorsements because Revised section 4-406 eliminated the
reporting requirement for indorsements.
Likewise, if the court utilizes the same application of proceeds of
the checks, the drawer should have no recourse, and the fact that a jury
finds a plaintiff contributorily negligent should have no bearing.
In Ed Stinn Chevrolet, which followed the rule of Perini Corp. v.
First National Bank,'' both the drawer's and payee's signatures were
forged, and recovery was allowed to the drawer based on the forgery of
his signature rather than the forgery of the fictitious payee's signature.
What happens, however, if the drawer's signature is forged, but the
check is paid without anyone indorsing the name of the fictitious payee?
Does this fact situation fall within Perini? In a well analyzed case, the
Sixth Circuit held:
Application of the Perini rule requires that the four fictitious payee
checks be treated as if they bore only forged drawer's signatures.
Although the drawee is negligent in paying a check that lacks the
indorsement of a named payee, the drawer's loss is caused by the
forged drawer's signatures. The drawer did not intend payment to
any payee, so no payee can appear and demand payment. The danger
guarded against by the requirement of a proper indorsement is absent.
It is irrelevant whether the payee is real or fictitious and whether the
indorsement is forged, missing, or otherwise defective.
l52
J. Crooked Employee of Drawer Forges Payee's Name with a
Restrictive Indorsement
Any discussion of the fictitious payee caper would be incomplete
without a discussion of Underpinning & Foundation Constructors, Inc.
v. Chase Manhattan Bank.'5 3 In this case, an accounting department
employee of Underpinning prepared false invoices from companies with
which it had current business relationships. 54  The employee (alone or
151. 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977).
152. National Credit Union Admin. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 771 F.2d 154, 160 (6th Cir.
1985).
153. 414 N.Y.S.2d 298 (N.Y. 1979), expressly followed, State of Qatar v. First Am. Bank, 880
F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Va. 1995).
154. Id. at 299.
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with others) placed restrictive indorsements (such as "For Deposit
Only") on the checks issued to pay the false invoices, signed the payees
names, and either cashed the checks or deposited them in accounts in the
names of persons other than the named payees.155 The employee alleg-
edly stole over a million dollars.1 56 Underpinning sued the depositary
bank, not the drawee bank, and the court held that although there was
conflict in the cases of New York and other states as to whether a drawer
would normally have a cause of action against a depositary bank, where
the depositary bank ignores a restrictive indorsement, the drawer may
sue. 157 The unclear holding that the indorsement was "effective," 15 8 was
explained by the court:
Had the forger in this case not forged a check with a restrictive
indorsement, it would appear that the loss might properly be placed
upon the drawer alone. A restrictive indorsement, however, imposes
a new and separate duty upon a transferee to pay the check only in
accord with the restriction. In this case, the restrictive indorsement
required that the checks be deposited only in the accounts of the
respective restrictive indorsers, the named payees. This was not done
and the failure to do so serves as a basis for liability independent of
any liability which might be created by payment over a forged
indorsement alone.159
This statement contains a patent ambiguity: if the accounts of the
"respective restricted indorsers" means that these persons must have had
an account in the bank and that they did not, then there was no possible
way for the depositary bank to act in accordance with the restrictive
indorsements. On the other hand, if the forgers opened accounts in the
bank in the name of the payees, would this have satisfied the quoted
language?
Underpinning did not answer these questions, but in the case of
Spielman v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.16 0 the court explained
that:
In Underpinning, the checks were restrictively indorsed "for deposit
only", followed by the stamped name of the payee. The payees had
no account in the depositary bank, however, and we found a violation
of the restrictive indorsements because the depositary did not, indeed
it could not, deposit the proceeds in the accounts named as it had
been directed to do. Instead, in clear violation of the indorsements,
the depositary either credited the checks to the account of the forger
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 302.
158. Id. at 301.
159. Id. at 303.
160. 456 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1983).
[Vol. 49:607
CHECK SCAMS
or paid cash to him. Thus, it failed in its obligation to deposit the
checks to the account of the payee as the indorsement required. 161
A fair reading of the above quotation might indicate that even if the
forger opened accounts in the name of the named payees, and deposited
the checks into these accounts, the court might still have held that the
bank did not act consistently with the indorsement, giving the drawer a
cause of action against the depositary bank. In Spielman, a dishonest
litigator falsely induced his client to draw a check payable to the law
firm of opposing counsel. 162 The dishonest attorney indorsed the check:
Pay to Special Account
#012-043478 [Acct. of dishonest attorney]
s/ Pitney, Hardin & Kipp [alleged payee law firm]
For Deposit Only
Special Account 012-043478163
The court held that these facts were not controlled by Underpinning
because the indorsements were effective even though the customer was
identified by account number rather than by name. 164 The depositary
bank followed directions and was not liable to the defrauded drawer
client.
In comparing the degree of fault in the two cases, it would seem
that the employees of the depositary in Underpinning totally disregarded
the restrictive indorsements, while the Spielman employees tried to carry
out a confusing indorsement and placed the funds in the numbered
account. The lack of clear direction in Old section 3-405 of the UCC
invited this bifurcated approach. Revised section 3-404 seems to clar-
ify, at least in part, the problem of the account name versus account
number. Revised section 3-404(c) provides that if the check whether or
not indorsed is deposited in the depositary bank to an account in a name
substantially similar to that of the payee, it is proper.1 65 Underpinning
suggests that if the forger had an account in the name of the named
payee, deposited the checks without indorsement, and the bank employ-
ees applied the checks to the named account, the drawer would have no
cause of action against the depositary bank. Under the facts of
Spielman, if the forger deposited the checks without indorsement, the
bank would have to deposit them in the account of Pitney, Hardin &
Kipp (the opposing counsel), not under the numbered account of the
dishonest lawyer, to avoid liability to the drawer. But under the specific
161. Id. at 1194 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 1193.
163. Id. at 1194.
164. Id.
165. U.C.C. § 3-404(c) (1990).
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facts of Spielman, where the dishonest lawyer did not sign his name but
used his account number as a substitute, would the result be the same?
K. Can Payees Recover from Drawee and/or Depositary Banks
Under the Fictitious Payee Doctrine?
"Snow diagram"









Both of the above diagrams represent cases where customers have
stock accounts in stockbrokers' companies. A dishonest employee or a
dishonest spouse induces the companies to issue checks made payable to
the name of the payee-customers. The dishonest employee or spouse
indorses the check and deposits it in the depositary bank which collects
from the drawee-payor bank. Upon discovery of the defalcations, the
payees seek to bring suit against the presumably solvent drawee, collect-
ing bank, or both. Normally, if the customer is not guilty of any wrong-
doing (as would be the usual case), she would have an action against the
brokerage company for the return of "her" money. The brokerage com-
pany would then sue the drawee bank and be met by the fictitious payee
defense.
However, if, for some reason, the payee desires to sue the drawee
and/or depositary bank directly and to by-pass the brokerage company,
does she have standing to do so? At least two courts have answered that
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question affirmatively. 166 The McAdam case set out various theories as
to why the payee should have standing, and Snow followed them.
Unfortunately, neither case paid any attention to a simple question:
where and when did the payee acquire a property interest in the check?
The payee in Snow never had possession or delivery of the checks issued
to her estranged husband who did not purport to impersonate her or be
her agent. 167 In McAdam, the broker was the supposed agent of the cus-
tomer, a legal status sufficient to show possession, but this aspect was
not discussed. 16 Both courts agreed that the payees could not be barred
from suing by the fictitious payee defense, which was designed to pre-
clude the drawer, not payee, from recovery.
It would seem that in both cases, if the brokerage company had
assigned its rights to the payees, they would have received clear right to
sue without property right worries.
III. IMPERSONATION SCAMS




Impersonation schemes differ from fictitious payee scenarios in one
main aspect: the impersonator is not an employee or agent of the
drawer, but an outsider who dons the trappings of a payee.
166. McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1990); Snow v. Byron,
580 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
167. Snow, 580 So. 2d at 239.
168. McAdam, 896 F.2d at 753.
1995]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Neither Old section 3-405 nor Revised section 3-404 devote any
real effort to defining the words impostor or impersonation except to
state the latter could be accomplished by use of the mails or otherwise.
Old § 3-405:
(1) An indorsement by any
person in the name of a named
payee is effective if
(a) an impostor by use of the
mails or otherwise has induced the
maker or drawer to issue the
instrument to him or his
confederate in the name of the
payee;
Rev. § 3-404:
(a) If an impostor, by use of
the mails or otherwise, induces the
issuer of an instrument to issue the
instrument to any impostor, or to a
person acting in concert with the
impostor, by impersonating the
payee of the instrument or a person
authorized to act for the payee, an
indorsement of the instrument by
any person in the name of the
payee is effective as the
indorsement of the payee in favor
of a person who, in good faith,
pays the instrument or takes it for
value or for collection.
Not evident from a quick comparison of the two sections is the
different definitions of forgery. Under Old section 3-405, if the "impos-
tor" pretended to be an agent of the payee, the impersonation would be
ineffective and any indorsement of the payee's name would be forgery.
Conversely, under Revised section 3-404 if an "impostor" pretends to be
the agent of the payee and a check is issued "to the order of the payee,"
anyone can indorse the payee's name and it will not be a civil forgery
but an effective endorsement.
Shube v. Cheng is a classic impostor case.' 69 Mr. and Mrs. Shube
contracted to purchase a home from Mr. and Mrs. Cheng; Apple Bank
financed the sale and took back a purchase money mortgage. 170 The
closing was attended by the buyers, the sellers (allegedly the Chengs),
and at least eight other clerks and attorneys. 17 The closer for the title
abstract company demanded identification of "Mr. Cheng," and "he"
produced only an insurance card and credit card, alleging "he" did not
drive and did not have a driver's license.' 72 The sellers' attorney also
vouched for the identification of "Mr. Cheng.' 73 The Apple Bank
check was indorsed, deposited with Citibank, and paid by Apple before
169. 596 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).






the signature was found to be a forgery. 174 Apple brought suit against
Citibank, and the Shubes sued the "sellers' " attorney and the title
closer.17 5 The court held that Old section 3-405 was a complete defense
to Apple Bank's breach of warranty suit against Citibank as the deposi-
tary bank, noting that Apple Bank's attorney attended the closing and
was present at the identification of "Mr. Cheng," and thus Apple Bank
was in a better position to detect the fraud than was Citibank.' 76 The
results were nightmarish. The Shubes did not get title, the real Chengs
were left with a mortgage clouding their title, the buyers sued the "sell-
ers' "attorney, the title company lost its money, and the title company's
closing clerk probably lost his job.
A Pennsylvania case foreshadowed the Cheng result. 177 A husband
was the administrator and sole heir of his mother's estate, which
included a house. 178 His estranged wife arranged, through her attorney
and a real estate broker, for a mortgage to be placed on the house with-
out his knowledge.' 79 Before the mortgage closing the wife appeared in
her attorney's office with a man whom she introduced as her husband
but who was an impostor.' 80 After the wife and "husband" signed the
mortgage papers, she announced he would not attend the mortgage clos-
ing. '8 At closing, when the attorney and the real estate broker told the
title company's clerk that they saw the husband sign the mortgage, the
clerk notarized the signature of the "husband."' 82 The title company's
check was then delivered to the wife, who signed her name, forged her
husband's name, and cashed it.' 83 The court held the impersonation
triggered Old section 3-405, and that the signature of the husband was
not a forgery.' 8 4 Neither the attorney nor the real estate broker had any
personal knowledge of the real husband's identity, yet they foolishly
relied upon the hearsay identification. Even more foolishly, the notary
clerk acknowledged the "husband's" signature by relying on the attorney
and real estate broker. But could the title company recover against the
attorney, as the Cheng sellers attempted?
An Oklahoma case addressed this question. 185 James F. Beaird, Jr.,
174. Id.
175. Id. at 337.
176. Id. at 339.
177. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 212 A.2d 222 (Pa. 1965).






184. Id. at 226.
185. A.M. Covington v. Penn Square Nat'l Bank, 545 P.2d 824 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
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a purported oil company employee, contacted prospective purchasers of
an oil lease.' 86 The lessees inquired with the oil company which con-
firmed employment of a man named "Baird."'' 1 7 Mr. Beaird told the
lessees that he spelled his name with an "I," and was presented with
cashier's checks payable to James Beaird. 188 He then told the bank
cashier that his name was misspelled, indorsed the check both ways,' 89
and eventually, the checks were paid. The purchasers of the cashier
checks sued the depositary banks, but the court held that as they dealt
directly with the impostor, they should bear the loss.1 90 The court did
not apply the "mirror image" rule.
Three recent cases warrant discussion at this point. In the first, a
"financial advisor" induced a client to purchase a single premium annu-
ity policy of insurance. '1 The advisor applied in the client's name,
opened a post office box as the mailing address of the client, and corre-
sponded with the insurance company by using the client's name. 92
After receiving two checks disbursing funds to the client, the advisor
signed the client's name, indorsed his name, deposited the checks in his
account, and embezzled the proceeds.' 93 The parties to the suit agreed
that the advisor corresponded with the insurance company on numerous
occasions by using the name of the client.' 94 The drawee bank sued the
depositary bank of the advisor.
When the drawee bank sued the depositary bank, the court found
the "[T]he record is so replete with such references that there can be no
argument that [the advisor] assumed the identity of [the client] in all of
his communications with Fidelity and did not merely forge [the client's]
signature."' 9 The court granted summary judgment to the depositary
bank under the impostor rule of Old section 3-405.196 The case illus-
trates an impersonation "by use of the mails or otherwise," and shows
the difficulty in detecting a scam before completion. The case seemed
to indicate that the premium for the annuity was in excess of $80,000, a
policy size perhaps justifying the use of face-to-face communication and
a handwriting sample to identify the insured.
In the second case, Mr. England contacted Asher Corporation




190. Id. at 826.
191. Dominion Bank v. Household Bank, 827 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
192. Id. at 465.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 465-66.
195. Id. at 467.
196. Id. at 468.
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regarding a lease-back transaction for equipment. 197 England claimed to
be the operator of Hawks Sales Corporation, and gave Asher the tele-
phone number of his receptionist who answered "Hawks Sales Corpora-
tion."' 98 England also supplied phony financial statements of Hawks
Sales Corporation and of the alleged president, Harvey Hawks.199 Asher
issued checks to Hawks Sales Corporation which England had restric-
tively indorsed and deposited by a third party.2 °° Asher assigned its
rights to an assignee who sued the third party and his depositary bank.201
The trial court granted summary judgment for the third party and deposi-
tary bank, holding the checks were made payable to an impostor and the
loss therefore fell on Asher, the drawer of the checks.20 2 The appellate
court found controverted facts and remanded.20 3 In a well reasoned
analysis of the difference between impersonating a person and imperson-
ating an agent of a person, the court stated:
Here, it is undisputed that someone posed as Harvey Hawks when
that person signed Harvey Hawks's name to the various documents.
Therefore, applying § 3-405(1)(a) to this uncontroverted fact, an
imposture occurred if Asher was induced to issue the instruments by
the documentation which contained the forged signature of Harvey
Hawks, either individually or in his capacity as an authorized agent of
Hawks Sales Corporation.2 4
In the third case, a life insurance company, unable to locate one
Patricia Butler, beneficiary under a policy, deposited the $75,000 in pro-
ceeds with the county clerk.20 5 Mickey June Jones, impersonating Patri-
cia Butler, employed a small law firm to represent her.2 06 A trial court
ruled that Patricia Butler was entitled to the $75,000, less poundage, or a
balance of $73,254.31, and ordered the county clerk to issue a voucher
to Patricia Butler and deliver it to her lawyer.20 7 The next day, one of
the lawyers accompanied "Patricia Butler" to the North Side State Bank
(NSSB) which honored the voucher and issued a cashier's check to
Patricia Butler.20 8 The bank did not require Patricia Butler to produce
197. Intelogic Trace Texcom Group, Inc. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 626 N.E.2d 839 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1993).
198. Id. at 841.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 841-42.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 847.
204. Id. at 845.
205. North Side State Bank v. Board of County Commissioners, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 800,
801 (Okla. 1994).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 801-02.
208. Id. at 802.
1995]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W REVIEW
identification. Her lawyer represented that his client was Patricia Butler
and that he had documentation to that effect, and he indorsed the
voucher as a guarantor.2" 9 "Patricia Butler" mis-indorsed the check as
"Patrica Butler," and North Side State Bank cashed it. The bank, upon
discovery of the impersonation, sued the Board of County Commission-
ers. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board,210
and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed, holding that the impostor
doctrine did not apply in this case:
211
The scenario in which the voucher came into existence and
reached the lawyer's hands clearly does not bring the case under the
impostor rubric. It was issued in the regular course of courthouse
business. No impostor here fraudulently induced the Court Clerk to
issue and hand over a voucher to the wrong person. Neither can we
view the earlier false in-court self-identification of the client as Patri-
cia Butler to create an impostor scenario in the UCC sense of the
term. The court's order directed payment to a correctly named bene-
ficiary-also identified as a defendant in the case-by voucher to be
issued and delivered to her counsel of record-an officer of the court.
NSSB [the bank] cashed the critical voucher upon a forged
endorsement. Because the impostor rule is not invocable, the
endorsement by the client-a forgery-could not be effective to pass
title to a holder in due course. The client's position vis-a-vis the bank
was that of a stranger who sought to cash a check. Before giving
value and issuing its cashier's check NSSB had the duty to identify
her as the named payee of the depositary voucher.
Neither can the impostor rule operate in favor of NSSB qua
drawer of the cashier's check. The rule protects, not the drawer, but
only those who take from a drawer, as issuer of the item, in circum-
stances that call for the impostor rule's application. NSSB must
hence bear the loss from the forged endorsements on both the court
fund voucher and on its own cashier's check.
We hold that NSSB cannot invoke in this case the impostor rule
against the Board. NSSB's acquaintance with the lawyer did not
relieve that bank from its duty to secure a valid endorsement from the
voucher's named payee. NSSB should have verified the payee's
identity rather than rely on the representations of the purported
payee's lawyer.21 2
With all due respect to the court, this confidence woman, "by use of
the mails or otherwise," impersonated Patricia Butler. In doing so, she
fooled everyone who dealt with her. The holding on the impostor rule is
209. Id.
210. Id. at 803.




just obviously wrong.213 It is interesting to note that five of the justices
concurred in the opinion while four others concurred in the result,
whatever it was.214 This case deserves considerable criticism.
B. Crook Expressly or Impliedly Represents that He Is an Agent for
Another
It was relatively clear under Old section 3-405 that the word
"'impostor' refers to impersonation, and does not extend to a false rep-
resentation that the party is the authorized agent of the payee. The...
drawer who takes the precaution of making the instrument payable to the
principal is entitled to have his indorsement.
215
This statement seems perfectly clear in a factual vacuum, but
becomes muddled when applied to a common case. For example, a hus-
band applies for a loan by mail and forges his wife's signature on the
promissory note and mortgage or security agreement to secure the loan.
If afterwards the loan officer is examined concerning the loan approval
and closing, he will probably say "I thought the husband was mailing the
papers on behalf of the other spouse, and I never considered the possibil-
ity of forgery." There may not be an express representation of agency,
but the agency factor is certainly implied. Is there an "impersonation"
under Old section 3-405? A review of decisions on the subject indicates
different perspectives.
In a recent case, a couple (apparently from Ohio) were in Massa-
chusetts when the husband wrote an Ohio bank to arrange for a loan. 16
The couple were longtime customers of the Ohio bank, and the loan
officer knew them personally.2"7 The husband forged his wife's name
on the loan application papers and on the promissory note, and the Ohio
bank issued a check payable to both. 18 The husband again forged his
wife's name when cashing the check with a Massachusetts bank.219 The
Massachusetts bank, when sued by the Ohio bank defended on the the-
ory that the husband had impersonated the wife and under Old section 3-
405 anyone could indorse the wife's name.22 A majority of the court,
after reviewing cases from New York and Florida, held that:
The only inquiry is whether Bauerband [the husband], as an impostor,
213. The author has no quarrel with the part of the decision which dealt with sovereign
immunity. See id. at 810.
214. Id.
215. U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 2 (1989).
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by the use of the mails or otherwise induced Minster [the Ohio bank]
to issue the check to him in the name of the payees. By his conduct
in signing the wife's name to the promissory note and submitting it to
Minster, he was holding himself out as Michelle Bauerband [his
wife] in writing. In acknowledging that she will pay the note and that
she had received a copy of it, Bauerband was purporting to be
Michelle when he forged her name and sent the note to Minster. He
was impersonating her, not in the literal "in person" sense, but "by
use of the mails or otherwise," as stated in § 3-405 (l)(a). In signing
Michelle's name to the note, Bauerband implicitly was indicating that
he was Michelle.22'
The dissenting judge was of the view that "[a] person can only
impersonate another person; he cannot 'impersonate' an activity. Bauer-
band "misrepresented his wife's participation. He did not 'impersonate'
it, and he did not impersonate her. '2 22 The majority's opinion correctly
noted that a divided Florida court, faced with substantially the same
facts, had held that a husband who forged his wife's name was not an
impersonator.223 The Florida court noted that the "husband did not rep-
resent... that he was the authorized agent for his wife. 224 In addition,
the deceived issuing bank had no previous dealings with the wife and
only the husband appeared at the mortgage closing.225 If anything, the
facts in the Massachusetts case are stronger against the issuing bank than
in the Florida case. Judge Letts's dissenting view in the Florida case
focused on the dominant intent of the issuing bank to deal not only with
the wife but also with the husband who was impersonating her in a cal-
culated fraudulent scheme as the basis for estoppel against the issuing
bank which more clearly occasioned the loss than did the collecting
bank.
Today, under Revised section 3-404(a), would the husband be
implicitly representing to the naive issuing banks to be "a person author-
ized to act for the payee" such that his actions would fall within the
broad agent-impostor rule?
In Franklin National Bank v. Shapiro,226 a wife allegedly arranged
(through the mail) for a joint-liability home improvement loan without
the knowledge of the husband, whose name was forged on the loan
checks.227 The court characterized the transaction as an impersonation
221. Id. at 202.
222. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
223. Broward Bank v. Commercial Bank, 547 So. 2d 687, 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
224. Id. at 688.
225. Id.




case under Old section 3-405, and the loss fell on the drawer.228
The "joint payee caper" is found in elementary loan transactions as
well as sophisticated commercial affairs. For example, a couple lent a
well-known real estate broker money for an investment that proved prof-
itable to all concerned. 2 9 The broker proposed another investment to be
financed by the husband and wife, and presented them with a promissory
note allegedly signed by both the broker and her husband.2 30 The broker
directed the wife/lender (her husband was absent) to issue a check
jointly to the broker and her husband, and after the broker's unexpected
death it was revealed that she forged her husband's signature on both the
promissory note and check.2 3 ' The husband and wife sued the broker's
estate and the drawee bank. The trial court found that the couple
intended both the broker and her husband to receive the proceeds of the
check, and that they were entitled under Old section 3-116(b) to the
genuine signatures of both the broker and her husband to be on it.
232
The appellate court affirmed, finding the drawee bank liable, but making
no mention of the impersonation doctrine.233
Old section 3-405 has been put to some strange uses. In one case, a
husband and his relative applied for a business loan.234 Both signed a
promissory note and the husband forged his wife's signature on both the
note and the resulting cashier's check.235 The wife never knew about
the loan until default, when the lender sued the husband, his wife, the
relative, and the depositary bank on its alleged breach of warranty on the
wife's signature. 236 The court held that the lender-bank never intended
that the wife have any interest in the check's proceeds, and hence there
was no actionable forgery, nor any breach of warranty.237
If a lender intends the proceeds of a loan to go to a husband, but
prepares a promissory note in the name of husband and wife jointly, and
a check is issued to them jointly, where the husband forges his wife's
name, the lender may not be able to recover from the drawee bank
because of this intent. If Old section 3-405 applies, the forged signature
of the wife on the check was effective for she was not intended to have
any interest in the check proceeds, and even if she is deemed to have
some minimal interest, the case may be covered not by the UCC but by
228. Id.
229. Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 368 A.2d 149, 150 (Conn. 1976).
230. Id. at 150.
231. Id. at 151.
232. Id. at 151.
233. Id. at 155.
234. American Nat'l Bank v. Seidel, 622 SW.2d 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981),
235. Id. at 20.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 21.
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pre-Code cases. In all of these situations, the lender has no recourse
against the drawee bank.23
The impersonation rule and the joint payee rule commonly apply in
the "blue collar" purchases of trucks and cars, where a member of a
credit union, a bank patron, or a customer of an automobile financing
company presents to a lender an allegedly agreed-to purchase contract
between the borrower and an auto dealer whose indorsement has been
forged. The lender issues a jointly payable check and delivers the check
to the borrower who forges the dealer's name. When the check is even-
tually paid and the lender brings suit against the drawee bank, the bank
invokes the protection of the impostor rule under Old section 3-405.
An Alabama appellate court took a very sophisticated approach to
this question. The court first noted that comment 2 to Old section 3-405
considered "impostor" to mean impersonation and not false representa-
tion of agency that the party is the authorized agent of the payee. 239 The
court went on to state that there was no evidence that the drawer dealt
with the crook as an impersonator of the dealer or that he represented
himself as the dealer's agent. 240 The court rejected the bank's view that
the crook, in supplying the forged contract allegedly signed by the
dealer, represented that he was a purchaser and, by forging the dealer's
signature, became an impersonator.24' The court stated:
In this case Mathis [the crook] merely misrepresented to the
drawer that he was purchasing an automobile and secured a loan
through such misrepresentation. He strengthened his misrepresenta-
tion by a forged purchase order but he never led the drawer to believe
that he had any authority to negotiate the check on behalf of Pierson
[the dealer], and the drawer never intended that Mathis should do so.
Had there been no forged purchase order and the drawer had issued
its check upon oral representation alone of Mathis, there could be
little argument that the drawer would be entitled to the endorsement
of Pierson. Thus, as we see it, this is not a case for the application of
the "impostor rule" but is a matter of misrepresentation implemented
by forgery of the purchase order. There was no intent, fictional or
otherwise, by the drawer that Mathis should supply the endorsement
of Pierson Chevrolet, Inc. The drawer was entitled to such endorse-
ment and the responsibility was upon the collecting bank ... to exer-
cise reasonable commercial standards in accepting it for payment.242
A delightful double impostor scheme was displayed in a Texas
238. See generally Gordon v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 280 N.E.2d 152 (Mass. 1972).
239. East Gadsden Bank v. First City Nat'l Bank, 281 So. 2d 431, 433 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973).
240. Id. at 433-34.




case, where a prospective purchaser of a "front loader" applied for a
purchase money loan.243 The lender inspected the machine and
approved the loan conditioned on obtaining a note with the signatures of
both the purchaser and a guarantor.244 The purchaser/debtor delivered
the note and directed the lender to prepare a draft payable to the sellers.
Shortly thereafter, a man representing himself to be "J. L. Williams"
appeared at the lender's office and tendered a bill of sale allegedly
signed by the two sellers. "Without requiring any identification, South-
western [the lender] accepted the bill of sale and delivered the draft to
the supposed J. L. Williams. 245 Still later, the debtor presented the
draft, supposedly indorsed by the two sellers, and deposited the draft in
his account without the depositary bank requiring any indorsement of
him. 246 The draft was paid by a cashier's check to the depositary which
issued a cashier's check to the debtor. The debtor made three payments
and then defaulted. 247 The "front loader" was a stolen machine, and no
trace of the sellers was found. The lender sued the debtor, guarantor,
and two other parties. The court held that "J. L. Williams" was both an
impostor and also an impostor of J. L. Williams; "an impostor may
impersonate a fictitious person.
248
It is interesting to note that no one ever questioned how the debtor,
who was to use the check to pay for the machine, ended up with posses-
sion of the check after the "sellers" allegedly indorsed it. This magical
progression should have excited the suspicion of someone.
When a crook applies for a purchase money car loan, supplies a
phony sales contract allegedly signed by the dealer, and is issued a cash-
ier's check in the joint names of "buyer" and "dealer," this is not an
impersonation case. The word impersonation "does not extend to a false
representation that a party is the authorized agent of the payee,' 249 and
when the issuer makes the check payable to the dealer he is entitled to a
genuine indorsement of that dealer.
Assume a man applies for a loan to purchase a car from his father-
in-law, the issuing bank issues the check in the name of the debtor and
the father-in-law, and the debtor then forges the father-in-law's signature
on the check.250 This might not qualify as an impostor case because the
243. Fair Park Nat'l Bank v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 541 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976).




248. Id. at 269.
249. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 656 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1982).
250. See Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 328 N.Y.S.2d 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1972). Accord Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 454 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
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debtor did not impersonate the father-in-law, and may not qualify as a
fictitious payee case because the bank ascertained that the father-in-law
existed, and it intended that he receive the loan proceeds. Under this
view, the depositary bank would be liable to the lending bank.
2 51
Under Old section 3-405, it was well established that if an individ-
ual impersonated the agent of another, the impersonating agent would
not have the power to indorse the principal's name.252 Revised section
3-404 changed this rule, but how will the revised law treat the case of an
embezzling actual agent? For example, the general manager of a car
dealership had actual authority to transfer sales and leasing contracts to a
bank that would issue cashier's checks in payment to the dealership. 3
The manager devised a scheme of assigning fictitious sales and leasing
agreements to the bank, and depositing the cashiers' checks in a local
bank account.254 While he initially made payments on the fictitious con-
tracts to delay the day of reckoning, eventually his activities were dis-
covered.255 The court found the dealer was an agent of the payee, not an
agent of the drawer, and therefore the fictitious payee rule under the old
Code was inapplicable.256 On the same facts today, if a court found the
dealer's conduct amounted to impersonation, a court might pin the loss
on the depositary bank due to breach of warranty. Perhaps neither the
drawer bank nor the depositary bank would be guilty of any actual negli-
gence in the issuance and payment of the checks. Should the rule be any
different when the drawer is not a bank but a finance company suing its
drawee bank which has cross-claimed against the depositary bank?
The impersonation scenario can be very byzantine. For example, a
"Dan Palmer," purporting to be an agent for Monarch Investment Com-
pany of Colorado, sold Mr. Neibauer a stolen backhoe for $6,500.257
Palmer took Neibauer's personal check payable to Monarch to the
drawee bank and exchanged it for a cashier's check payable to Monarch
Investment. 8 Palmer then took the cashier's check to Monarch Coin
Corporation in Salt Lake City, Utah, and he asked to exchange it for
$6,500 in gold coins.259 A Monarch Coin employee telephoned an
employee at the issuing bank, who inquired if the check was being used
to purchase the backhoe. The Monarch Coin employee testified that she
251. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
252. Thornton & Co. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 260 S.E.2d 765 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 587 P.2d 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
253. Seattle-First Nat'! Bank, 587 P.2d at 621.
254. Id. at 621-22.
255. Id. at 621.
256. Id. at 624.
257. Valley Bank v. Monarch Inv. Co., 800 P.2d 634, 635 (Idaho 1990).
258. Id. at 634-36.
259. Id. at 636.
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told the bank she was calling from "a coin company and I am calling on
that, '260 but ultimately exchanged the check for the coins. Meanwhile,
the backhoe was delivered without a bill of sale.261 Neibauer directed
the bank to stop payment, and the backhoe was returned to the true
owner.
The court held that Dan Palmer impersonated that he was an agent
for Monarch, not Monarch itself, and therefore, the drawee bank was not
entitled to deduct the amount of that check from Neibauer's account.262
However, the drawee bank which exchanged Neibauer's personal check
for a cashier's check was liable to the Monarch Coin Company, a holder
in due course.26 3
The opinion in Monarch Investment begins: "This is a tale of two
checks. ' '2 64 The court could have stated: "This is a tale of two checks
that ends with the irony that the careless purchaser of stolen equipment
puts the risk of loss on a naive bank." The purchaser of the backhoe was
"fooled by a con man, but does not suffer loss because the con man
impersonated that he was an agent of a company rather than a person. A
quirk in the law saved the victim of a scam, and placed the loss on a
naive bank.
What would happen today? Under Revised section 3-404, "Dan
Palmer" could impersonate an agent of the payee, Monarch Investment,
and effectively indorse for the company. The result would be total loss
to the purchaser with no loss to the bank.
In a recent case from New York, a con man induced an investor to
draw checks totalling $650,000.00, payable to a fictitious entity as part
of a "Ponzi" scheme.265 The defrauded drawer sued three banks which
asserted that the con man was an agent of the drawer under Old section
3-405. The court denied summary judgment to the banks because of
outstanding factual questions. 266 Had Revised section 3-404 been in
effect, the issue would have been: did the con man represent that he was
authorized to act on behalf of an impersonator under subsection (a)?
The case of Thompson Maple Products, Inc. v. Citizens National
Bank267 illustrates a case that was correctly decided on one theory, and
that could be correctly and similarly decided on a new theory of the law.
Thompson made bowling pin blanks from maple logs, brought to
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 638.
263. Id. at 639-40.
264. Id. at 635.
265. Morrow v. Apple Bank for Savings, 599 N.Y.S.2d 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
266. Id. at 33.
267. 234 A.2d 32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967).
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its mill by log haulers.268 One of these haulers, a "trusted friend" of the
Thompson family, obtained blank "scaling slip" forms from employees
of Thompson, recorded fictitious deliveries to the mill on behalf of local
log owners and submitted the signed "scaling slips" to the Thompson
bookkeeper.269 Checks made out to the alleged log owners were then
wrongfully cashed or deposited by the hauler who fraudulently obtained
over $100,000.270 When the drawer sued the drawee bank for wrong-
fully paying checks with forged indorsements, the trial court found that
the drawer company was negligent in providing "scaling slips" to its
"trusted friend." '271 The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the
bank on the same grounds, but seemed to compare the hauler to an agent
for the drawer under Old section 3-405(1)(c), who caused the loss to fall
upon the employer.
2 72
In deciding the Thompson case today, a court could say that where
the hauler impersonated that he was "authorized to act" for the log own-
ers, he would have the power under Revised section 3-404(a) to effec-
tively indorse their names, with the loss of the forgery again falling upon
the drawer. One major advantage of the new law is that it should not
require the expense of a full-blown trial to arrive at the same result.
268. Id. at 33.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 32.
271. Id. at 33-34.
272. Id. at 36.
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IV. THE NEW ENTRUSTMENT DOCTRINE
Diagram A
Drawee Bank Depositary BankI I
Drawer Payees
Entrusted Employee of (forg.)
Drawer forges payee's name
Diagram B






As represented by the above two diagrams, where an employee
forges the names of payees on checks that her employer signed as
drawer (Diagram A), or she forges her employer's name as payee of
checks received (Diagram B), either forgery was historically treated the
same; the loss falls on the drawee and depositary banks unless the
employer's negligence in the hiring and/or supervision process substan-
tially contributed to the loss under Old section 3-406. In addition, negli-
gence in detecting and reporting the losses might bar an employer under
the time limitations provisions of Old section 4-406. In both foregoing
cases, if the employee was careful to open accounts in the names of the
payees in the depositary banks, it was unlikely that both the depositary
and drawee banks would be able to prevent the fraud, thereby imposing
risk and liability without wrongdoing.
The drafters of Revised article 3 have tried to level the playing field
by initially placing the loss on the entrusting employer, who may be able
to pass on some or all of the loss to banks that fail to exercise ordinary
care and substantially contribute to the loss.
Under Revised section 3-405, an employer bears the loss in both of
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the above diagrams if she entrusts her employee with "responsibility"
for any one or more of the following processes:
(i) to sign or indorse instruments on behalf of the employer,
(ii) to process instruments received by the employer for book-
keeping purposes, for deposit to an account, or for other disposition,
(iii) to prepare or process instruments for issue in the name of
the employer,
(iv) to supply information determining the names or addresses
of payees of instruments to be issued in the name of the employer,
(v) to control the disposition of instruments to be issued in the
name of the employer,
(vi) to act otherwise with respect to instruments in a responsible
capacity.
273
The seemingly awesome, all-encompassing breadth of number six
is immediately curtailed by language stating that " '[r]esponsibility'
does not include authority that merely allows an employee to have
access to instruments or blank or incomplete instrument forms that are
being stored or transported or are part of incoming or outgoing mail, or
similar access. 274
To summarize, any employee entrusted with any of the six "func-
tions" listed above has the power both to indorse her employer's name
as payee of incoming checks and to sign the names of payees on outgo-
ing checks. To mitigate the opportunities of the employee to steal, it
would seem advisable for the employer to use an outside accounting
firm to handle bookkeeping duties. Unfortunately, Revised section 3-
405(a)(1) defines the word "employee" as including "an independent
contractor and employee of an independent contractor retained by the
employer. '275 Of course, such an employer would have a cause of
action against the accounting firm in the event of loss.
Where using an outside accounting firm would not be feasible, the
author's students usually suggest the purchase of a surety bond to cover
defalcations by the employee. A potential $100,000 deductible, com-
bined with a costly premium, hardly makes surety bonds a panacea.
2 76
Corporations that directly pay the credit card bills (or other bills) of
their employees should take note of a recent case.2 77 A New York cor-
poration maintained a bank account at Chemical Bank for the payment
273. U.C.C. § 3-405(a)(3) (1990).
274. Id.
275. U.C.C. § 3-405(a)(1) (1990).
276. The drafters of Revised section 3-405, comment 1 agree with the students. U.C.C. § 3-
405 cmt. 1 (1990).




of employees' withholding taxes. The corporation's independent
accountant wrongfully used checks appropriately signed for deposit in
the tax account and totalling $317,932.81 to pay his credit card bills at
Chem Credit Services and Chemical Bank Delaware, affiliates of Chem-
ical Bank.278 Chemical Bank applied the checks to the accountant's per-
sonal credit card debts, and when the fraud was discovered, the
corporation sued Chemical Bank.2 79 The court held in accord with prior
authority that Chemical Bank was a holder in due course of the checks,
being without notice of the accountant's use of another's checks to pay
his own bills.28 0 The court noted that Chemical Bank, rather than its
affiliated companies, was named payee, but found this to be common
practice when drawers leave off parts of an official name, such as "Co."
or "Inc." '281
How could this case be approached today under Revised article 3?
The terse facts of this case indicate the accountant would meet the defi-
nition of an "employee" (independent contractor) "entrusted" with the
preparation of the withholding checks, giving dishonest accountant (or
his accomplice) the power to indorse checks and to place the loss upon
the corporation. The result should be the same.
This fraud could easily have been prevented if the check signer
clearly typed or wrote the purpose of the various checks before delivery
to the accountant for mailing. Better yet, by giving the accountant the
check preparation function but requiring a corporate official to double-
check the purpose of the checks (and make notation on them) before
mailing, the company would be better protected. Of course, no precau-
tions protect an employer where all the employees conspire to steal
together.
A variation of the situation where an employer pays employee
debts with company checks was presented in another New York case.2"2
A company manager issued company checks payable to his personal
creditors, but bearing creative variations of their names, such as "Metro-
politan Oprtg. Co.," for Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. and "Ame-
rex Corp.," for American Express Company. 83 Checks totalling
$162,538.65 were embezzled in this manner. 28 4 The employer corpora-
tion sued the various payees, but the court held that where it is common
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 683.
281. Id.
282. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. American Express Co., 518 N.Y.S.2d 93 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1987).
283. Id. at 95.
284. Id.
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for employers to pay their employees' debts with corporate checks, the
payees were holders in due course in spite of the minor errors in their
names.285 The court reasoned that these creditors had no knowledge that
the signer of the checks was improperly using his employers' funds to
pay his past debts, but seemed to suggest that if the employee was using
his employer's checks to pay simultaneously for present value, the payee
might well have sufficient notice of a defalcation.286
A better system for employers who are paying employee business
expenses is to issue reimbursement checks clearly identifying the nature
of the payment. This procedure might curtail the foregoing practices
and satisfy the Internal Revenue Service in the process.
In State v. Barclays Bank,287 a business employed an independent
accountant to prepare state income tax returns, and gave him checks to
pay the respective taxes.288 The accountant forged the indorsement of
the State, and deposited the checks in his own account.289 When they
were eventually paid, the taxing authorities sued the depositary and
drawee banks for honoring the checks.29° The court held that absent the
property interest that would accompany delivery of the checks, the State
had no cause of action.291 This holding is followed in Revised section
3-420(a) which states that an action for conversion may not be brought
by a payee "who did not receive delivery of the instrument either
directly or through delivery to an agent or a copayee. 292 Why the State
sought recovery from the depositary and drawee banks, rather than the
drawer, is a mystery.
Under Revised article 3, Barclays Bank would not be a fictitious
payee case because the intent of the check signer, not the dishonest
accountant, would determine its nature.293 On the other hand, since the
accountant was an independent contractor, he might well come within
the entrustment doctrine of Revised section 3-405, and would have the
power to embezzle these funds.
There are two "attorney-defalcating" cases that deserve attention.
In a case from Missouri, Mrs. Bagby retained an attorney "for the pri-
mary purpose of obtaining an appointment of guardianship for her two
minor children so that certain shares of Sears, Roebuck stock could be
285. Id. at 96-97.
286. Id. at 97.
287. 563 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y. 1990).
288. Id. at 12.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 15.
292. U.C.C. § 3-420(a) (1990).
293. U.C.C. § 3-110(a) (1990).
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issued to them ... ,",294 from their father's probate estate.295 Merrill
Lynch, at the attorney's unauthorized direction, opened an account in
Mrs. Bagby's name, without ever seeing her.296 The stock was delivered
to Merrill Lynch; the attorney obtained a court order authorizing its
sale. 297 The checks issued to Mrs. Bagby by Merrill Lynch were mailed
to the attorney, who forged Mrs. Bagby's name and absconded with the
proceeds.298 Mrs. Bagby sued Merrill Lynch, which sued the drawee
bank for conversion, which, in turn, sued the collecting banks for indem-
nification based upon their indorsement warranties. 299 The court held
that Merrill Lynch (which had settled with Mrs. Bagby) could recover
against the drawee bank because, although Merrill Lynch had breached
the New York Stock Exchange rule about knowing your customer, its
issuance and delivery of the checks to Mrs. Bagby's attorney did not
substantially contribute to the forgery. 300 The drawee could, in turn,
recover from the collecting banks.30 1
In the second case,302 the holder of three life insurance checks total-
ling $135,000, the proceeds of her deceased husband's life insurance
policies, alleged that "[o]ne Emanuel Pavsner, who at that time served as
plaintiff's attorney, was authorized to deposit the checks in a bank
account bearing her name. Instead of doing so, Pavsner forged [the
widow's] indorsement on the instruments and deposited them in his per-
sonal account maintained at defendant Chemical Bank.
30 3
The attorney absconded with the proceeds, and the widow brought
suit against the depositary bank. The court held that she could waive a
time barred conversion action and still sue the bank under quasi contract
principals.
30 4
In both of these cases, clients initially cheated by their attorneys
had recourse against other solvent parties. Could these widows today be
forced to bear the loss? In both cases, the attorneys, as independent
contractors, deposited checks (Hechter) and handled stock and stock
proceeds (Bagby). It could be argued today that under the entrustment
doctrine of Revised section 3-405, the loss should fall on the clients
294. Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192, 195 (8th Cir. 1974).
295. Id. at 194.
296. Id. at 195.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 194.
300. Id. at 197.
301. Id. at 199.
302. Hechter v. New York Life Ins. Co., 385 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 1978).
303. Id. at 552.
304. Id. at 553.
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rather than banks which have little, if any, opportunity to prevent this
kind of fraud.
The facts of a New York case today could fit neatly under the ficti-
tious payee doctrine, as well as under the "new" entrustment doctrine.3 °5
An employee of the New York City Board of Higher Education had the
"duty to prepare requisitions for checks to be issued ... for scholarships
and other payments to students, to prepare the checks, to have them
signed by authorized personnel, and to send the checks to their recipi-
ents.13 0 6 Sometimes she retained possession of the checks, and soon
forged their indorsements and cashed them at the drawee bank. Deposi-
tions of bank employees revealed that the woman would often cash a
number of checks with different payee names, and the bank never
inquired as to her authority.307 The bank's tellers knew that she was not
the payee on these checks, and that she was an employee of the drawer.
The court held that the gross negligence and bad faith of the drawee, if
proved at trial, would affect the bank's liability.308 Cases like this one
were surely considered by the draftsmen of Revised article 3.
The adoption of the entrustment rule, along with Revised section 3-
420 (which eliminates the language of Old section 3-419(3)), should
signal the partial demise of Cooper v. Union Bank,30 9 a case that has
engendered so much critical comment.
In Cooper, an attorney employed a former client as his secretary-
bookkeeper, despite a gambling addiction.310  The employee forged
indorsements on twenty-nine incoming checks payable to either the law-
yer or his clients, cashed or deposited the checks, and embezzled the
proceeds.31' Upon discovering the scheme, the attorney sued the
drawee-payor banks and the collecting banks.31 2
The California Supreme Court held that when the drawee-payor
bank paid these checks it was not paying the identifiable check proceeds,
but it was paying its own funds. 3 13 When the attorney-payee sued the
collecting banks, he ratified the collection of the proceeds from the
drawee-payor bank to the collecting banks, and when the collecting
banks previously paid the forger, they were paying their own funds, not
305. Board of Higher Education v. Bankers Trust. Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976).
306. Id. at 510.
307. Id. at 511.
308. Id.
309. 507 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973).
310. Id. at 618.
311. Id. at 612.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 615.
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the proceeds of the checks.3" 4 Using this "off-again-on-again" proceeds
approach, the court bypassed the Old section 3-419(3) obstacle and
placed liability on the collecting banks.315
If Cooper were considered under Revised article 3, the rationale
would be much simpler. The employee would appear to be an
"entrusted" person under section 3-405, with the power to indorse
checks made payable to her employer. Any discussion of proceeds
would be totally eliminated, and the loss would fall on the employer,
except where a failure by the payor or collecting banks to exercise ordi-
nary care substantially contributed to the loss.
But one nagging problem would remain: how do we handle those
checks that were made payable to the clients by third persons-the so-
called "incoming" checks? Those checks cannot (in most cases) be
treated as fictitious payee checks, nor are they expressly covered by the
entrustment rule. The "negligence" sections of 3-406 and 4-406 would
be applicable, and the California courts could still use the proceeds rule,
if it was still in force.
V. WRONGFUL COLLECTION OF JOINT PAYEE (OR JOINT SPECIAL
INDORSEE) CHECKS
Old section 3-116 of the UCC provided, in a backhanded manner,
that an instrument payable to the order of two or more persons "if not in
the alternative is payable to all of them," and may not be discharged
except by all of them.31 6 The Official Comment to section 3-116
described the different wording in alternative and joint payees. 3 17 It
seems clear under the comment that a check made payable to "John
Smith and Henry Jones" would be payable to joint payees. But how
about a check made payable to "John Smith/Henry Jones?" The last
paragraph of the comment suggests an instrument made payable to A
and/or B, is payable in the alternative to A, or to B, or to A and B
together.31 8 The comment does not address the common format "paya-
ble to A/B."
314. Id. at 619.
315. Id. at 619-20.
316.
3-116. Instruments Payable to Two or More Persons An instrument payable to the
order of two or more persons
(a) if in the alternative is payable to any one of them and may be negotiated,
discharged or enforced by any of them who has possession of it;
(b) if not in the alternative is payable to all of them and may be negotiated,
discharged or enforced only by all of them.
U.C.C. § 3-116 (1989).
317. U.C.C. § 3-116 cmt. (1989).
318. Id.
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The virgule, or "slash" (/), is found in some modem dictionaries to
mean the word "or. ' 319 If the volume of recent case law is any indica-
tion, this definition of the virgule is not widely known among laymen.
For example, in a recent case a con man induced the payee of a cashier's
check to specially indorse it to "Fidelity/JHL & Associates," and signed
for JHL & Associates exclusively. 320 The payee testified that she
intended that both special indorsees would have to indorse, 32 1 but the
court properly held that the indorsement was in the alternative, and that
the depositary bank was not liable for conversion.322
Other courts have decided similarly:
The virgule is normally used to separate alternatives. Thus, a bank
exercising reasonable care and acting in good faith would necessarily
interpret a check drawn to two payees whose names are separated by
a virgule as being drawn payable to the payees in the alternative ....
Such a check is functionally identical to one drawn payable to two
payees in the manner "A or B".323
It is common for drawers to issue checks made payable to two or
more "joint" payees. For example, insurance companies issue settle-
ment checks made jointly payable to a plaintiff and his lawyer, banks
issue checks jointly to building contractors and their suppliers, and
insurance companies issue checks to insureds and their secured lenders.
These transactions anticipate that two (or more) joint payees will
indorse, and each party will receive its respective share of the proceeds.
Too often, however, a joint payee forges his copayee's name or simply
cashes the check in the absence of the copayee's indorsement. What are
the rights and liabilities of the various parties in the check collection
chain?
A recent Massachusetts case provides a partial answer. In GMAC
v. Abington Casualty Insurance Co.,324 an insurance company issued a
settlement check jointly to the insured and to GMAC, the secured
lender. The check was delivered to the insured, who promptly cashed it
319. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 759 (2d College Ed. 1983). But see FUnK &
WAGNALLS STANDARD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1497 (1974 ed.) (defining the virgule as indicating
"two alternatives, as in and/or ...
320. Mumma v. Ranier Nat'l Bank, 808 P.2d 767, 767 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 769.
323. Dynalectron Corp. v. Union First Nat'l Bank, 488 F. Supp. 868, 869 (D.D.C. 1980). See
also Ryland Group, Inc. v. Gwinnett County Bank, 258 S.E.2d 152, 153 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979);
Brown Strober Bldg. Supply Corp. v. Living House, Inc., 433 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1980);
Miron Rapid Mix Concrete Corp. v. Bank Hapoalim, 432 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
324. 602 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1992).
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without the indorsement of GMAC.3 25 GMAC received none of the pro-
ceeds, and sued the insurance company, rather than the insured or the
drawee bank.326 The court held, under prevailing case law, that delivery
of a joint payee check to one of the payees constitutes delivery to the
other.327 Under Old sections 3-116 and 3-603, however, such a negotia-
ble instrument could not be discharged by the actions of only one payee,
and where the underlying obligation for which the check was issued was
not discharged, GMAC could sue on that obligation. 328 Finally, the
court held that under Old section 3-804, GMAC could sue as the owner
of a lost instrument.329
The court regretfully recognized that its decision could result in
circuitous litigation; if GMAC prevailed, the insurance company would
be forced to bring a conversion action against the drawee bank for pay-
ing a check missing an indorsement. 33° The court suggested that GMAC
should have sued the drawee bank directly, as the true owner under Old
section 3-419.331 When the facts of GMAC inevitably arise again, the
result on the issue of dual delivery should be the same under Revised
section 3-420.
What happens if both the depositary and drawee banks overlook the
absence of an indorsement by one of two joint payees? Can the drawee
return the check to the depositary bank after paying it? These facts
occurred in a Texas case where the payees were "Engineered Metal
Works and E.G. Smith Construction. 3 32 Engineered Metal Works
indorsed the check and deposited it in the depositary bank, which
presented the check to the drawee bank.333 The drawee bank paid the
check, and it returned it with the drawer's monthly statement.334 When
the drawer complained about the missing indorsement, the drawee
attempted to return the check to the depositary bank by a "late return"
letter. 335 The letter was refused and the drawee sued for breach of war-
ranty. The court held under Old section 3-116, that the check was
improperly presented without both indorsements, and that the payment
325. Id. at 1086.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1087.
328. Id. at 1088.
329. Id. at 1089.
330. Id. With all due respect, the true cause of action would be for breach of contract under
section 4-401.
331. Id.
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by the drawee bank did not preclude it from returning the check and
asserting a claim against the depositary bank under sections 4-213 and
4-302.336
Joint payees drafts from insurance companies present difficult
problems when payable to husband and wife who are estranged. In one
case, a couple's mobile home and furnishings were destroyed by fire.3 37
The husband signed the claim forms in the names of his wife and him-
self, even though the couple was separated. 338 The insurance company
issued $16,000 worth of drafts jointly payable to husband and wife along
with proof of loss forms. 3 39 The husband cashed the drafts by forging
the wife's name, and she eventually sued the insurance company.34 °
The court held that Old section 3-116 required the indorsement of both
payees, that neither spouse was automatically authorized to sign for the
other, and that the company was guilty of conversion under section 3-
419.341 The decision suggested the wife had standing to sue because of
the delivery of the draft to the husband, but failed to address the obvious
property issue: Since the husband had no actual or apparent authority to
sign for his estranged wife, how did delivery to the husband give the
wife a property right in the drafts?
If a check is made payable to an attorney and her client, section 3-
116 would normally require joint indorsements. However, a retainer
contract in a recent case gave an attorney the authority to sign for the
client as joint payee provided the attorney deposited the check in a
escrow account.342 The attorney indorsed his client's name, but embez-
zled the proceeds. The court held that the lawyer "was authorized to
make a general endorsement despite the condition that [the check] sub-
sequently be deposited into an escrow account. Because the conversion
... of the proceeds cannot be held to retroactively render an otherwise
valid endorsement a forgery," the payor bank was not liable to the cli-
ent.34 3 The attorney certainly violated a condition subsequent and
undertook a forgery, however, these arguments were not raised. In addi-
tion, no UCC citations were used in the court's decision.
Some of the difficulties presented by joint payee checks were
nicely illustrated in a case where a check was made payable to:
336. Id. at 301. In light of a recent case, Sun Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 637 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), this "right" of chargeback after final payment seems
dubious. A breach of warranty claim is more appropriate.
337. Quintana v. Allstate Ins. Co., 378 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
338. Id. at 42.
339. Id. at 41.
340. Id. at 42.
341. Id. at 44.
342. Rohrbacher v. Bancohio Nat'l Bank, 567 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
343. Id. at 433.
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Stockport Farm Supply [first line]
L.PS [second line] 3"
The check was stamped with the rubber stamp indorsement "For
Deposit Only, Stockport Farm Supply," and deposited in the defendant's
bank.34 5 No one at the bank inquired as to what the initials "L.PS" stood
for, in spite of the fact that Stockport Farm Supply had overdrawn its
account thirty-four times in the preceding year and a half.3 46
The court held that the fact that the payees were listed on two sepa-
rate lines indicated that the check was made payable jointly and not in
the alternative.347 Further, the bank did not act in a commercially rea-
sonable fashion under Old section 3-419(3), because while the payee
was ambiguous, the bank made no inquiry.348
When a joint payee is allowed to collect on a check without the
indorsement of the other payee, a showing by the depositary bank that
the cashing payee also drew a check on its account payable to the other
joint payee for the amount owing, is a valid defense to a conversion
action by the nonsigning payee. Further, it is not necessary to trace the
funds, dollar for dollar, from the check proceeds to payment to the other
payee. 349 This view is related to the case-created exception to section 3-
116, that a paying bank can defend payment on a forged or omitted joint




A drawee that pays on individually indorsed joint payee checks is
likewise not liable to the drawer if it can show that the drawer actually
suffered no loss, or that any loss suffered would have occurred, even if
the drawee bank had exercised ordinary care.3 5 1 The drawee bank's
payment on a check places the burden on the bank to show that its con-
duct did not cause the lOSS.
3 5 2
Additional perils of joint payee checks are illustrated in a recent
Minnesota case. An "experienced construction lender" presented five
jointly payable cashier's checks to a home builder.353 The lender
intended that the copayee title company would pay mechanic lien claim-
344. Van Lunen v. State Cent. Sav. Bank, 751 F. Supp. 145, 147 (S.D. Iowa 1990).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 148.
348. Id.
349. First Indep. Bank v. Stottlemyer & Shoemaker Lumber Co., 384 So. 2d 952, 954 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1980).
350. Sullivan v. Wilton Manors Nat'l Bank, 259 So. 2d 194, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
351. Sanwa Business Credit Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 617 N.E.2d 253, 258 (I11.
App. Ct. 1993).
352. Id. at 259.
353. Lassen v. First Bank Eden Prairie, 514 N.W.2d 831, 834 (Minn. 1994).
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ants for two homes, but the builder deposited the checks without the title
company indorsement.354 When the builder defaulted on the loans, the
lender foreclosed on the homes, and discovered extensive mechanics'
liens on the properties.35 5 The lender sued the drawer-drawee of the
checks for honoring them without the title company indorsements. The
court held that the bank was not liable for conversion because the lender
was not the holder of the checks,356 but stated the bank would be liable
for payment in violation of the joint payee requirement to the extent that
the lender could show it was foreseeable that the proceeds of the checks
would be wrongfully applied.357 Further, in the absence of bad faith, the
bank could not be liable for more than the face amount of the five
checks.358
It is strange that an "experienced construction lender" delivered the
checks to the builder rather than to the "deep-pockets" title company,
which would have charged the lender a relatively small sum for disburs-
ing funds as compared to the losses (proceeds of checks, attorney fees,
etc.) suffered by the lender in this case.
The foregoing cases illustrate the basic flaw in the joint payee sce-
nario; the joint payee approach encourages the very problems it seeks to
solve. In theory, neither joint payee can frustrate the rights of the other.
In practice, one joint payee, by forgery or by ignorant cooperation of a
less than diligent bank, is able to cash the check and abscond with the
proceeds. Insurance companies, for example, should deliver joint payee
checks to secured lenders rather than individual insureds, who may be
tempted beyond their endurance to be dishonest. Let the "deep-pocket"
secured lending institution disburse the proceeds between itself and the
insureds.
The joint payee problem becomes more acute when checks are
issued both to financially shaky general contractors and their equally
unstable subcontractors or materialmen, because the first payee in pos-
session may perpetrate a fraud. Unfortunately, even in the legal profes-
sion there have been many instances of lawyers forging their clients'
signatures on joint payee checks. Accordingly, we need to develop
some secure, inexpensive system of disbursing proceeds to "joint" pay-
ees who have diverse interests and flexible morals.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 838-39.
357. Id. at 838.
358. Id. at 837.
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VI. MISCELLANEOUS CHECK DEPOSITING SCAMS
In the case of First Rome Bank v. Reese Oil Co., 3 5 9 an oil company
hired the wife of the executive vice president of First Rome Bank, and
authorized her to open mail, post customers' accounts, fill out custom-
ers' receipts, make out deposit slips and take them to the bank, and rec-
oncile monthly bank statements. 360 The president of the company had,
on occasion, cashed corporate checks stamped for deposit only, and the
employee proceeded, without authority, to do the same.36' When the oil
company discovered the $20,000 embezzlement loss, it sued First Rome
Bank.362 At trial, it was shown that First Rome's teller manual stated
that checks made payable to a corporation should never be cashed; how-
ever, the bank president testified that the manual was a guideline for
practices and procedures, but the preferences of the bank's customers
were also an important consideration.363 The trial court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the oil company, and the appellate court
reversed on the grounds that the employee had actual authority to place
restrictive indorsements on checks made payable to the company.
364
The case was remanded to decide whether it was commercially reason-
able for the bank to have cashed these checks, although failing to follow
its own manual was not enough, by itself, to impose legal liability upon
the bank.365
A similar case arose in Arkansas.366 A lumber yard apparently
authorized its bookkeeper to deposit checks at a depositary bank and to
accept part of these checks in cash by notating "less cash" on deposit
slips. 367 When the bookkeeper retired, his successor continued the sys-
tem, embezzling $74,897.78 over twelve years. 36 8 The embezzling
bookkeeper stole money from the cash drawer, and would replenish the
cash with the "less cash" deductions from deposits. 369 The trial court
held the bank negligent in allowing the "less cash" deductions, but found
contributory negligence, along with the estoppel and laches generated by
the long delay in discovering the loss, barred the depositor's recovery.3 7 0
In addition, the bank had not converted the depositor's cash payments
359. 426 S.E.2d 384, 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
360. Id. at 384-85.
361. Id. at 385.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 386.
365. Id.
366. J.W. Reynolds Lumber Co. v. Smackover State Bank, 836 S.W.2d 853 (Ark. 1992).
367. Id. at 854.
368. Id. at 855.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 856-57.
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based on the established practice between the parties. 37'
It is submitted, with all due respect, that the court could have held
(in accord with Ed Stinn Chevrolet37 ) that inasmuch as the employee
did not steal the funds received, but deposited them in the cash drawer,
she stole from the employer after the employer had actual possession of
the cash. As a result, the "less cash" payments were not the cause of the
loss; the embezzlement from the cash drawer was the cause, and should
not be blamed on the bank.
In a recent California case,3 73 a small, closely held company, gave
its bookkeeper, Mr. Yip, actual authority to deposit checks payable to
the company into the company account.37 4 Yip opened two unauthor-
ized accounts at two different banks, the first in the off-name of
"Oswald's Machine Equipment Co. ' 375 Three months after opening the
account, he furnished the depositary bank with a forged "corporate reso-
lution" authorizing the account.3 76 Yip then opened another account in
another bank in the off-name of "Oswald Equipment. ' 377 He used
deposit indorsement stamps to deposit checks payable to his employer in
the two accounts embezzling over one million dollars.3 78 The employer,
Oswald Machine and Equipment, Inc., sued both banks. The trial court
granted summary judgment to both banks on the theory that Yip, being
authorized to deposit his employer's checks, was authorized to deposit
in the false accounts, with the loss falling on his employer.379 The
appellate court reversed, holding that the extent of this authority was a
question of fact, in light of the employer's conversion claim under Old
section 3-419 (1)(C).
38 °
The cited section (which protected depositary banks from liability
beyond the proceeds still remaining in its hands, unless the bank was not
in good faith or did not act in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards) has been generally repealed via Revised section 3-420(c).381
In addition, if Oswald Machine was decided under Revised section 3-
405, the bookkeeper would have the power to indorse the corporate
name and deposit checks in accounts "in a name substantially similar to
371. Id. at 857.
372. 503 N.E.2d 524 (Ohio 1987).
373. Oswald Mach. & Equip., Inc. v. Yip, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
374. Id. at 194.
375. Id.




380. Id. at 196.
381. See U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 3 (1990).
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the name of that person."38 Of course, subsection (b) would require a
comparison of the employer's fault in hiring and supervising a crooked
employee, balanced against the bank's negligence in opening the
account and allowing deposit of the check.383
An Iowa case further illustrates the dangers in the depositing pro-
cess.38 4 The dishonest manager of an auto supply store was authorized
to deposit, but not draw, checks in the company account. The employer
furnished a rubber stamp for indorsement that did not have the words
"For Deposit Only" or other restrictive language, but merely included
the name and address of the employer company. 385 The manager per-
sonally cashed checks at the depositary bank by either rubber stamp or
written indorsement and, on occasion, instructed his bookkeeper to cash
checks and give him the proceeds.386 The bank never questioned the
authority of the manager, and eventually claimed holder in due course
status when sued by the store.387 The court held that the signature stamp
was, at best, ambiguous, and that the bank's employees should have
inquired about the authority of the manager to cash the checks.3 8 The
decision seemed to stress that handwritten indorsements were unusual
for a business and should have excited further inquiry.389 Further, the
court held that under Old section 3-419(3), the bank's failure to question
the manager's authority to make cash withdrawals from presented cor-
porate checks was commercially unreasonable, rendering section 3-406
inapplicable.
390
In this case, the very negligent owner of the business prevailed
against the very negligent bank, but at what cost? The store recovered
approximately $25,000, but it had to go through a trial and an appeal to
the Iowa Supreme Court. In addition, the unsuccessful bank had to pay
for attorneys' fees and court costs. This case could have been avoided if
each of the parties had used a modicum of care in the conduct of their
respective businesses.
In a related case, a sales manager opened an unauthorized checking
account in the name of the corporation, for diverting customers'
checks. 39 1 His actions did not fall under the fictitious payee rule
because these checks were already coming to the corporation, and the
382. U.C.C. § 3-405(c) (1990).
383. U.C.C. § 3-405(b) (1990).
384. Waukon Auto Supply v. Farmers & Merchants Sav. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1989).
385. Id. at 845.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 846.
388. Id. at 849.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 850.
391. Hydroflo Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 349 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Neb. 1984).
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manager had nothing to do with their origin.39 2 While the depositary
bank could be liable for negligence, today the bank could invoke
Revised section 3-405, if the manager had been entrusted with one or
more of the processes mentioned in that section.393
One of the newest scams originated in Louisiana. A Louisiana
bank, fearful that wrongdoers would be able to cash lost customer
checks made payable to "cash," instructed its customers to make their
checks payable to the order of the bank and then to indorse them at the
bank counter.394 When an employee of a bank client learned of the
bank's instruction, he indorsed his employer's checks (which the
employer had drawn for deposit with the bank), and cashed them at the
bank.395 The bank asserted that it was a holder in due course, but the
Louisiana court held that the bank knew that the employee was not
authorized to sign for his employer and was therefore liable.396 The
court pointed out the ironical fact that it was the bank's efforts to prevent
fraud that allowed this very fraud to happen.397
VII. COMPARATIVE FAULT
Old Sections 3-405 and 3-406 of the UCC did not provide for any
concept of relative fault governing fictitious payees and impersonations.
Only Old section 4-406 made a grudging acknowledgment of the con-
cept by providing that if a customer failed to exercise timely, ordinary
care in the examination of his returned checks and provide timely notice
of forgeries and alterations to the drawee bank, he would be precluded
from recovery unless he could establish a lack of ordinary care on the
part of the bank in paying the items.398
This former approach has been abandoned in Revised articles 3 and
4 which introduce the concept of comparative fault. Now under sections
3-404(d), 3-405, and 4-406, the trier of fact is invited to compare the
fault of the "party bearing the loss" and the "taker" or "payor" of the
item, 399 and "the person bearing the loss may recover from the person
failing to exercise ordinary care to the extent the failure to exercise ordi-
nary care contributed to the loss. ' '4° ° The concept of ordinary care for a
392. Id. at 620-21.
393. See U.C.C. § 3-405 (1990).
394. South Rayne Water Corp. v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 619 So. 2d 158, 159 (La.
Ct. App. 1993).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 160.
397. Id.
398. U.C.C. § 4-406 (1989).
399. U.C.C. §§ 3-404(d), 4-406 (1990).
400. U.C.C. § 3-405(d) (1990).
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bank is given a definition that is favorable to banks in Revised section 3-
103(a)(7):
In the case of a bank that takes an instrument for processing for col-
lection or payment by automated means, reasonable commercial stan-
dards do not require the bank to examine the instrument if the failure
to examine does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures and the
bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general banking
usage not disapproved by this Article or Article 4.4°1
The comment to this subsection points out that this "particular rule
applies primarily to Section 4-406 . - o2 Comment 4 to section 4-
406 points out:
The term "ordinary care" used in subsection (e) is defined in Section
3-103(a)(7), made applicable to Article 4 by Section 4-104(c), to pro-
vide that sight examination by a payor bank is not required if its
procedure is reasonable and is commonly followed by other compara-
ble banks in the area. The case law is divided on this issue. The
definition of "ordinary care" in Section 3-103 rejects those authori-
ties that hold, in effect, that failure to use sight examination is negli-
gence as a matter of law. The effect of the definition of "ordinary
care" on Section 4-406 is only to provide that in the small percentage
of cases in which a customer's failure to examine its statement or
returned items has led to loss under subsection (d) a bank should not
have to share that loss solely because it has adopted an automated
collection or payment procedure in order to deal with the great vol-
ume of items at a lower cost to all customers.40 3
There may be a latent danger in the "no duty to examine" approach
if an unsophisticated court should incorrectly apply it where a customer
makes a timely complaint to her drawee-payor bank about a forgery of
her name as drawer on a check, and the bank denies a duty to examine
the customer's signature under Revised section 3-403.
Returning to the notion of comparative fault, as the comments to
Revised sections 3-404 and 3-405 stress, the drawer of a fictitious and/
or impersonation check may have a cause of action against the deposi-
tary bank. The text of 3-404(d) includes the person "paying the instru-
ment or taking it for value or for collection. '' 404 It would seem that the
holding in Stone & Webster Eng 'g Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust
Co.,40 5 that a drawer of a check cannot sue a depositary bank where the
drawer's employee forges the payee's name and collects the proceeds,
401. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990).
402. U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt. 5 (1990).
403. U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 4 (1990).
404. U.C.C. § 3-404(d) (1990)
405. 184 N.E.2d 358 (Mass. 1962).
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has been reversed. Now, the customer may sue the payor bank, the
depositary bank, and any takers or collecting banks.
Depositary banks may also be liable for a lack of ordinary care in
opening an account for a dishonest employee of the drawer:
Suppose in Case # 5 that the check is not payable to an obscure "Sup-
plier Co." but rather to a well-known national corporation. In addi-
tion, the check is for a very large amount of money. Before
depositing the check, Employee opens an account in Depositary Bank
in the name of the corporation and states to the person conducting the
transaction for the bank that Employee is manager of a new office
being opened by the corporation. Depositary Bank opens the account
without requiring Employee to produce any resolutions of the corpo-
ration's board of directors or other evidence of authorization of
Employee to act for the corporation. A few days later, the check is
deposited, the account is credited, and the check is presented for pay-
ment. After Depositary Bank receives payment, it allows Employee
to withdraw the credit by a wire transfer to an account in a bank in a
foreign country. The trier of fact could find that Depositary Bank did
not exercise ordinary care and that the failure to exercise ordinary
care contributed to the loss suffered by the Employer. The trier of
fact could allow recovery by Employer from Depositary Bank for all
or part of the loss suffered by Employer.4 °6
The quoted Comment presents a worst-case movie scenario with
enough lack of care to alert even the most naive or lethargic bank
employee, but what if we modify one or more of the facts? Most
embezzlements do not involve well-known corporations as payees.
Many scams involve forged corporate resolutions or other paper authori-
zations to open checking accounts. Wire transfers to foreign countries
seem rare in check scams.
Under the facts of Comment 4, how would six jurors (or, alas,
twelve jurors) agree on the percentage of fault based upon each of the
stated factors? It is likely that each juror would state his percentages for
each party, and then the percentage would be averaged to arrive at the
abhorred quotient verdict. On a more cynical note, how will the average
jury arrive at comparative fault when the victim is the neighborhood
hardware store or dress shop, and the drawee is the largest bank in the
community? Finally, what effect will comparative fault have on the
incidence and duration of litigation? The lawyers of defrauded custom-
ers may be encouraged to sue banks, since the prospects for recovery are
improved, and the banks' lawyers may use the reality of increased risk
to increase billable hours in defending cases: the trial bar may be
rewarded at the expense of the public.
406. U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 4 (1990).
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VIII. OTHER VOICES-WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE DOING
Every tme a check is presented for payment to a drawee bank the
bank must worry whether the item is properly payable.4 °7 The fictitious
payee, the impostor rule, and the new entrustment rule all give shape to
the "properly payable" concept. If one were writing on a clean slate,
one might ask why the drawee bank and, for that matter, the depositary
and collecting banks, should become embroiled over the nature of the
payee's (or payees') signatures in the conduct of their activities. In the
vast majority of bank collections, the respective banks have no way of
knowing why a particular check was drawn and issued by the drawer.
Was this check issued to a payee whose name was falsely supplied by an
employee of the drawer, or was his name falsely supplied by the
employee of the payee? Was this payee impersonated? The questions
are innumerable, yet the bank will not know of a fraud until someone
files a claim.
When a debtor pays her creditor in cash, she knows that if some-
thing goes wrong in the payment process (such as fraud by the creditor),
the initial and perhaps the final loss will fall on the debtor, and she will
take precautions to protect herself. Once the debtor elects to use a check
to pay the same creditor, she enlarges the scope of responsibility and
may relax precautions, knowing the risk may be passed to someone else.
The law in the United States has for so long encouraged this risk spread-
ing approach, that it is now, perhaps, in the very nature of things.
Other countries and cultures have addressed these problems in
ways the American legal system might learn from. For example, The
Geneva Convention on Bills of Exchange of 1932 provides:
The possessor of a bill of exchange is deemed to be the lawful holder
if he establishes his title to the bill through an uninterrupted series of
endorsements, even if the last endorsement is in blank. In this con-
nection, cancelled endorsements are deemed not to be written. When
an endorsement in blank is followed by another endorsement, the per-
son who signed this last endorsement is deemed to have acquired the
bill by the endorsement in blank.
Where a person has been dispossessed of a bill of exchange, in
any manner whatsoever, the holder who establishes his right thereto
in the manner mentioned in the preceding paragraph is not bound to
give up the bill unless he has acquired it in bad faith, or unless in
acquiring it he has been guilty of gross negligence.4 °8
It might be thought that the foregoing convention is an old civil law
407. See U.C.C. § 4-401 (1990); U.C.C. § 4-401 (1989).
408. Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, June
7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 259 (1933-34).
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aberration to be discounted in the United States. However, the Draft
Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promis-
sory Notes, which has been signed, but not ratified by the United States,
states:
(1) A person is a holder if he is:
(a) ...
(b) In possession of an instrument which has been endorsed to
him, or on which the last endorsement is in blank, and on
which there appears an uninterrupted series of endorsements,
even if any endorsement was forged or was signed by an
agent without authority.4 °9
This proposed Convention does not apply to checks, but it does repre-
sent the current civilian thinking advanced by American drafters.
Under the Geneva Convention of 1932, followed in the domestic
law of much of the civilian world, a thief can steal a check, indorse the
payee's name, and pass it on to a good faith holder who will acquire
good title absent gross negligence.41 0 This holder can, in turn, deposit
the check in a depositary bank and collect from the drawee-payor bank,
both of which are protected by the depositor's "holder in due course"
status. The payee loses title, and any attendant cause of action, in the
same way a bona fide taker from the finder of lost cash would acquire
good title to the money in the United States. The losing payee is merely
left under this rule with a suit against the thief, the bad faith taker, or the
taker guilty of gross negligence.
Perhaps the civilian approach is too heretical for contemplation by
citizens of the United States, who may find the English system more
palatable. The English Stamp Act of 1853 stated:
Provided always, that any draft or order drawn upon a banker for a
sum of money payable to order on demand, which shall, when
presented for payment, purport to be endorsed by the person to whom
the same shall be drawn payable, shall be a sufficient authority to
such banker to pay the amount of such draft or order to the bearer
thereof; and it shall not be incumbent on such banker to prove that
such endorsement, or any subsequent endorsement, was made by or
under the direction or authority of the person to whom the said draft
or order was or is made payable either by the drawer or any endorser
thereof.
411
It would appear that this section of the Act is still in force in Eng-
409. John A. Spanogle, United Nations: Convention on International Bills of Exchange and
International Promissory Notes, 28 I.L.M. 170, 183 (1989).
410. Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, June
7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 259 (1933-34).
411. Stamp Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., ch. 59, § 19 (Eng.).
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land. In any event, much of this old act was incorporated into the Bills
of Exchange Act of 1882:
When a bill payable to order on demand is drawn on a banker, and
the banker on whom it is drawn pays the bill in good faith and in the
ordinary course of business, it is not incumbent on the banker to
show that the indorsement of the payee or any subsequent indorse-
ment was made by or under the authority of the person whose
indorsement it purports to be, and the banker is deemed to have paid
the bill in due course, although such indorsement has been forged or
made without authority.
4 12
It is notable that the drawee banker is protected only when he pays
the bill in good faith and in the ordinary course of business. These same
two terms are found throughout articles 3 and 4 of the UCC.
Under both of the above English statutes, the drawee bank is not
responsible for forgery of the payee's signature as it would be in the
United States. In addition to this protection of the drawee bank, the
Cheques Act of 1957 provides:
Where a banker in good faith and in the ordinary course of business
pays a cheque drawn on him which is not indorsed or is irregularly
indorsed, he does not, in doing so, incur any liability by reason only
of the absence of, or irregularity in, indorsement and he is deemed to
have paid it in due course.4 13
Again, the drawee bank is protected even when the check has not
been indorsed by the payee. The Cheques Act, not content to immunize
merely the drawee-payor bank, proceeds to protect the depositary col-
lecting bank as well:
(1) Where a banker, in good faith and without negligence,-
(a) receives payment for a customer of an instrument to which
this section applies; or
(b) having credited a customer's account with the amount of
such an instrument, receives payment thereof for himself;
and the customer has no title, or a defective title, to the
instrument, the banker does not incur any liability to the true
owner of the instrument by reason only of having received
payment thereof.
(2) This section applies to the following instruments, namely,-
(a) cheques;
(3) A banker is not to be treated for the purposes of this section as having
been negligent by reason only of his failure to concern himself with
412. Bills of Exchange Act 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 61, § 60 (Eng.).
413. The Cheques Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 36, § 1 (Eng.).
19951
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
absence of, or irregularity in, indorsement of an instrument.414
Inasmuch as both the drawee-payor bank and the depositary bank
are protected against suit by the true owner of a check, the only recourse
of the defrauded party would be against the forger, or one who took
from the forger. Section 24 of the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, states
in part:
[w]here a signature on a bill is forged or placed thereon without the
authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, the forged
or unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain
the bill or to give a discharge therefor or to enforce payment thereof
against any party thereto can be acquired through or under that signa-
ture, unless the party against whom it is sought to retain or enforce
payment of the bill is precluded from setting up the forgery or want
of authority.
415
It appears the deprived owner of a check could bring an action for con-
version against the wrongdoer, or an action for money had and received
for the proceeds of a collected check.416 The net affect of the English
legislation protecting banks is to leave litigation to the nonbanking
parties.417
414. The Cheques Act § 24.
415. Bills of Exchange Act § 24.
416. See MAURICE MEGHAH & FRANK R. RYDER, BYLES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 278-79 (25th
ed. 1983).
417. If published press reports are any indication, the impersonation scams have been
increasing both in raw numbers and in amount stolen. See generally Sharon H. Rosenberg, Check
Fraud Teams Targeting Banks, Business, MiAMi DAILY Bus. REv., Dec. 27, 1993 § I at 1; Hindi
Diamond, Banks Reacting to 'Epidemic' of Postal Thievery, S. FLA. Bus. J., Nov. 26, 1990, § 1 at
I. The typical scam will involve a residential tenant applying for a loan in the name of the real
property owner. If the property has an existing mortgage, a forged satisfaction of mortgage will
be recorded. At the closing, the "tenant owner" will present forged documents to prove his
identity. The closing check is then deposited in an assumed name account, and the proceeds
withdrawn.
A variation on this scheme is where a trespasser breaks into a vacant home, takes occupancy,
and tells neighbors that he has rented the house. The mortgage scam then proceeds in the above
manner. Of course, vacant lots can be fair game for loans as well. These mortgage scams are
difficult to prevent because of the ease, for example, in obtaining false drivers' licenses, but could
be decreased in number if lenders insisted upon the personal identification of the mortgage
applicants by reliable persons who have known them a long time. From personal observations at
numerous closings, the author can certify that most lawyers and notaries are naive in accepting
paper documentation as proof of identity. The possibility of malpractice suits is limitless.
Another recent and successful check scam is where crooks present forged cashier's and
certified checks to open checking and savings accounts. See Fred R. Bleakley, How They Bounce!
Bad Check Toll Rises As It Becomes Easier to Pull Off Such Fraud, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1993, at
1. These checks will appear to be issued or certified by real or imagined banks in Puerto Rico, for
example, or other distant sources. The "depositers" will then attempt a quick withdrawal to take
advantage of the early clearing times provided in Federal Reserve Regulations J and CC. Federal
Reserve System Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210.11 (1994); Federal Reserve System Regulation CC,




At first reading, it would appear that the draftspersons of section 3-
404 have adopted comparative fault and the entrustment principles in an
attempt to level the playing field between banks and their customers in
the paying and collecting of fictitious payee and impersonation checks.
A second reading, however, reveals that the entrustment approach will
probably swallow up most of the former fictitious payee and impersona-
tion cases. For example, the intent of the crooked employee no longer
has application under Revised section 3-404, but under Revised section
3-405, she has the power to indorse the payees' names on checks issued
by her employer.
Under Old section 3-405, if the signer of the check (or the person
who supplied the payee's name) did not acquire the intent to steal until
the issuance of the check, then her intent would not control. Now, under
Revised section 3-405, the intent of the crook controls no matter when
she acquired the intent to steal. Under the fictitious payee and imper-
sonation cases, only a limited area of payee names were fair game; now
any payee's name is fair game to an entrusted employee.418
dollars in losses for a large number of South Florida banks. The author has, for a long time,
advised his students to make a contemporaneous inquiry of the issuing or certifying bank named
on a check at closing. Telephone calls cost money, but counterfeit checks cost even more.
418. One final caveat must be made. A rash of bankruptcy cases illustrate a secondary scam
carried out by crooked employees who have been caught stealing and induce the victimized
employer to accept a promissory note for the stolen funds in exchange for a general release and a
covenant not to sue. See, e.g., In re West, 22 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1994). The cases do not articulate
why employers take these notes, but they are offered as a way of bargaining out of criminal
prosecution. When employees promptly file for bankruptcy and a discharge of the promissory
notes, the victimized entployers must then argue against discharged because the debts were
incurred as a result of the willful frauds.
Most of the courts have held that although a promissory note does not usually discharge an
underlying debt, when the creditor-employer gives a general release and a covenant not to sue, the
note will discharge the debt and substitute a new obligation dischargeable in bankruptcy. If the
release reserves rights on the original obligation it would not be dischargeable, but it seems clear
under this rationale, a careless employer can be cheated twice by the same crooked employee.
1995]
